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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following questions presented for review are
important questions which appear to be of first impression
concerning the limitations on negotiability and holder in due
course status under the particular statutory provisions and
should be settled by this court rather than the Court of Appeals,
Furthermore, to allow the Court of Appeals' decision to stand
would result in a gross miscarriage of justice because
§70A-3-304(2) (Utah Code Ann. 1965), indisputably eliminates
First Federal as a holder in due course as is discussed hereinafter.
I.

Did the Court of Appeals wrongly ignore the undis-

puted and critical fact that the Air Terminal note and its
contemporaneous accompanying Purchase and Security Agreement

-2were assigned and delivered to First Federal together as a
package pursuant to words of assignment prepared by First Federal,
and then wrongly hold that the wording in the note that "reference
is made to the Purchase and Security Agreement for additional
rights of the holder hereof" did not impair negotiability under
§70A-3"10^(1)(b) which states that to be negotiable an instrument
must contain "no other promise, order, obligation or power
given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this
chapter; . . ."?
II.

Whether the Court of AppealsT decision reversing

the trial courtTs judgment that the Air Terminal note was not
negotiable and First Federal was not a holder in due course
conflicts with this court's decision in Calfo v. P. C. Stewart
Co., et al., 30 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986),
concerning what constitutes notice to and knowledge of a potential
infirmity to a holder such as First Federal, under the circumstances herein?
III.

Whether the Court of Appeals wrongly reversed

the trial court (a) by holding that First Federal was a holder
in due course because it had no notice of a claim or defense
under §70A~3-30^(2) even though Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary,
received $18,500 from the $100,000 loan First Federal made
to Gump & Ayers because receipt of such amount by Gump & Ayers
was not a "benefit" under the statute, and (b) by wholly failing

-3to consider another portion of §70A-3"~304 (2) under which First
Federal was absolutely charged with notice of a claim when
Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary, assigned the Air Terminal note and
accompanying agreement to First Federal as security for Gump
& AyersT own $100,000 debt?
IV.

Did the Court of Appeals misinterpret §70A-3-119(D

and §70A-3-304(l) in holding that First Federal was a holder
in due course even though First Federal received the Air Terminal
note and agreement together and even though the agreement indicated
that there were limitations and that Air Terminal's obligation
was partly or wholly voidable?
REFERENCE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION
The Court of Appeals' opinion is reported in First
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Gump & Ayers Real Estate,
Inc. and Air Terminal Gifts, Inc., 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (April
11, 1989)-

A copy of the Court of Appeals' decision is included

in the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals' decision was entered on April
4, 1989.

There was no petition for rehearing filed, no request

for an extension of time in which to file for rehearing, and
no order entered in regard to a rehearing.

Jurisdiction is

conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court by §78-2-2(3)(a) and
(5) (Utah Code Ann. 1988).
STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The controlling statutory provisions together with
added underlining of the critical portions thereof are:
1.

§70A-3-10MD(b) (Utah Code Ann. 1965) Form of

negotiable instruments

...

(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument
within this chapter must

(b) contain an unconditional promise or
order to pay a sum certain in money and no other
promise, order, obligation or power given by the
maker or drawer except as authorized by this chapter;
~ ~. ~. (Emphasis added.)

§70A-3"105 (Utah Code Ann. 1965).

When promise or

order unconditional.
(1) A promise or order otherwise unconditional is
not made conditional by the fact that the instrument
(a) is subject to implied or constructive conditions; or
(b) states its consideration, whether performed
or promised, or the transaction which gave rise to
the instrument, or that the promise or order is made
or the instrument matures in accordance with or "as
per" such transaction; or
(c) refers to or states that it arises out
of a separate agreement or refers to a separate
agreement for rights as to prepayment or acceleration;
or

-5(d) states that it is drawn under a letter
of credit; or
(e) states that it is secured, whether bv
mortgage, reservation of title or otherwise; or
(f) indicates a particular account to be
debited or any other fund or source from which
reimbursement is expected; or
Cg) is limited to payment out of a particular
fund or the proceeds of a particular source, if the
instrument is issued by a government or governmental
agency or unit; or
(h) is limited to payment out of the entire
assets of a partnership, unincorporated association,
trust or estate by or on behalf of which the instrument is issued.
(2) A promise or order is not unconditional if the
instrument
(a) states that it is subject to or governed
by any other agreement; or
(b) states that it is to be paid only out of
a particular fund or source except as provided in
this section.

§70A-3~112 (Utah Code Ann. 1965).

Terms and omissions

not affecting negotiability.
(1) The negotiability of an instrument is not
affected by
(a) the omission of a statement of any consideration or of the place where the instrument is
drawn or payable; or
(b) a statement that collateral has been given
to secure obligations either on the instrument or

-6otherwise of an obligor on the instrument or that
in the case of default on those obligations the holder
may realize on or dispose of the collateral; or
(c) a promise or power to maintain or protect
collateral or to give additional collateral; or
(d) a term authorizing a confession of Judgment
on the instrument if it is not paid when due; or
(e) a term purporting to waive the benefit
of any law intended for the advantage or protection
of any obligor; or
(f) a term in a draft providing that the payee
by indorsing or cashing it acknowledges full
satisfaction of an obligation of the drawer; or
(g) a statement in a draft drawn in a set of
parts (Section 70A-3-801) to the effect that the
order is effective only if no other part has been
honored.

2.

§70A-3-H9 (Utah Code Ann. 1965).

Other writings

affecting instrument.
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee
or any transferee the terms of an instrument may be
modified or affected by any other written agreement
executed as a part of the same transaction, except that
a holder in due course is not affected by any limitation
of his rights arising out of the separate written agreement
if he had no notice of the limitation when he took the
instrument. (Emphasis added.)
(2) A separate agreement does not affect the
negotiability of an instrument.

-73.

§70A-3-304(l)(b) and (2) (Utah Code Ann. 1965).

Notice to purchaser.
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense

(b) the purchaser has notice that the
obligation of any party is voidable in whole or
in part, . . .
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against
the instrument when he has knowledge that a fiduciary
has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as
security for his own debt or in any transaction for
his own benef it or otherwise in breach of duty.
~ '. '. (Emphasis added. )

§70A-3-302(l)(c) (Utah Code Ann. 1965).

Holder

in due course.
(1) A holder in due is a holder who takes the
instrument
(c) without notice . . . of any defense
against or claim to it on the part of any
person. . . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
First Federal sued Gump & Ayers on its $100,000
promissory note payable to First Federal and sued Air Terminal
on its $125,000 promissory note payable to the Sunayers limited

-8partnership of which Gump & Ayers was the general partner.
When Gump & Ayers executed the $100,000 note, Gump & Ayers
assigned the Air Terminal note and its companion Purchase and
Security Agreement to First Federal as security for the Gump
& Ayers1 note.

The trial court granted summary Judgment to

First Federal on the Gump & Ayersf note but denied summary
Judgment on the Air Terminal note.
After a trial of the issues between First Federal
and Air Terminal, the trial court held that First Federal had
received the Air Terminal agreement and note as companion
parts of a single package transaction; that the Air Terminal
note incorporated rights in the accompanying agreement and
thus contained other powers which precluded negotiability;
that First Federal knew that Gump & Ayers was a fiduciary and
that First Federal had knowledge and notice of a limitation
in the companion agreement and of a claim against the Air
Terminal note under the applicable statutes.

The trial court

rendered judgment that the Air Terminal note was not negotiable
and that First Federal was not a holder in due course because
of actual knowledge and notice and was therefore subject to
Air Terminal's defenses against Gump & Ayers and Sunayers.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision and held that the Air Terminal note was negotiable
and that First Federal was a holder in due course.

-9-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are divided into numbered
paragraphs to make reference thereto more convenient:
1.

Air Terminal agreed to invest $200,000 in the

Sunayers Limited Partnership on June 5, 1984 by paying $75,000
in cash and executing a thirteen (13) page Purchase and
Security Agreement ("purchase agreement") together with a
contemporaneous and integrated companion promissory note in
the amount of $125,000. The Air Terminal purchase agreement
specifically incorporates the note in paragraph 2 thereof and
the note specifically refers to the purchase agreement "for
additional rights of the holder hereof."

Copies of the Air

Terminal note and purchase agreement were introduced as Trial
Exhibits 4 and 5, and are included in the Appendix.
2.

Under the Air Terminal purchase agreement Sunayers

is given the rights to sell the security, to charge expenses,
sell the partnership interest, declare a forfeiture, power
of attorney, delivery of assets, execution of documents and
all

other "remedies under law."
3.

(Trial Exhibit 5.)

The Air Terminal note (Trial Exhibit 4) contains

the following statement on page 2 just above the signature
line:
Reference is made to the Purchase and Security
Agreement for additional rights of the holder hereof.

-104.

The Air Terminal purchase agreement and note

were parts of a contemporaneous, integrated, package transaction.
(See T. 27"30; Conclusion of Law No. 2, R. 501.)
5.

After the Air Terminal purchase agreement and

note were signed, Gump & Ayers, the general partner of Sunayers,
borrowed $100,000 from First Federal, signed a promissory note
(Gump & AyersT note) for that amount which note does not indicate
the purpose of the loan, and assigned the Air Terminal note
and purchase agreement to First Federal as security for the
Gump & Ayers? note.
6.

(T. 8, 13.)

The original Gump & Ayers1 note and subsequent

renewal notes were prepared by First Federal (T. 15) and each
refers to the Air Terminal note and purchase agreement by the
following statement which is typed on the bottom of the Gump
& Ayers1 note (Trial Exhibit 3):
The indebtedness evidenced by this note is
secured by a Promissory Note dated June 5, 1984
and a Security Agreement of even date.
A copy of the last renewal Gump & Ayers' note which was the
note sued upon is included in the Appendix.
7.

First Federal was the author of the following

statement of assignment by Gump & Ayers to First Federal typed
on the bottom of the Air Terminal note at the time of assignment

(T. 14):

-11Sunayers hereby assigns, with recourse, all of its
right, title and interest in the above promissory note
and the agreement securing it to First Federal Savings
and Loan Assn. of Salt Lake City.
Sunayers Limited Partnership
by Gump and Ayers
Real Estate, Inc.
Its General Partner
8.

The amount of First Federal's $100,000 loan to

Gump & Ayers was based upon Gump & AyersT written list to First
Federal showing that the loan was in part to pay Gump & Ayers
$18,500 and to cover the Morse shortfall which Air Terminal
was indemnified against by the purchase agreement.

(Trial

Exhibit A; T-39.) There was no evidence that the $18,500 was
a "debt11 owed Gump & Ayers or was for any other specific purpose
except that it was on the Gump & Ayers' list below the wording
"ITEMS DUE TO MORSE SHORTFALL."

(See T. 19-20.)

A copy of

Gump & AyersT list is included in the Appendix.
9.

The Court of Appeals1 opinion does not refer

to the fact that the Air Terminal note and accompanying purchase
agreement were assigned to First Federal as a package for
security and does not discuss how such fact would affect the
issues of negotiability and First Federal's claim that it was
a holder in due course.

(See Court of Appeals' opinion pp.

28-31.)
10.

The Court of Appeals' opinion states that the

$18,500 Gump & Ayers received from the $100,000 loan was a
"debt due Gump & Ayers."

(Court of Appeals' opinion p. 28.)

-1211.

The Court of Appeals principally bases its holding

that the Air Terminal note was negotiable on its conclusion
that the Air Terminal note was unconditional.

(See Court of

Appeals' opinion p. 28.)
12.

The Court of Appeals' opinion concludes that

First Federal is a holder in due course because although Gump
& Ayers was a fiduciary, Gump & Ayers received no "benefit"
from the First Federal loan and because Gump & Ayers did not breach
its fiduciary duty in assigning the Air Terminal note to First
Federal.

(See Court of Appeals' opinion pp. 29~30.)
ARGUMENT

QUESTION I. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY IGNORE
THE UNDISPUTED AND CRITICAL FACT THAT THE AIR TERMINAL
NOTE AND ITS CONTEMPORANEOUS ACCOMPANYING PURCHASE AND
SECURITY AGREEMENT WERE ASSIGNED AND DELIVERED TO FIRST
FEDERAL TOGETHER AS A PACKAGE PURSUANT TO WORDS OF
ASSIGNMENT PREPARED BY FIRST FEDERAL, AND THEN WRONGLY
HOLD THAT THE WORDING IN THE NOTE THAT "REFERENCE IS
MADE TO THE PURCHASE AND SECURITY AGREEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE HOLDER HEREOF" DID NOT IMPAIR NEGOTIABILITY
UNDER §70A-3-10Ml)(b) WHICH STATES THAT TO BE NEGOTIABLE
AN INSTRUMENT MUST CONTAIN "NO OTHER PROMISE, ORDER,
OBLIGATION OR POWER GIVEN BY THE MAKER OR DRAWER EXCEPT
AS AUTHORIZED BY THIS CHAPTER; . . ."?
The Court of Appeals' opinion does not mention,
either in its recitation of facts or discussion, the undisputed
fact that First Federal received the Air Terminal purchase
agreement and note together as a package for security purposes
which fact and surrounding circumstances are essential to

-13a fair analysis of the issues and of the trial courtfs decision.
The above undisputed fact raises a number of pertinent questions
in this case discussed hereinafter both as to negotiability
and holder in due course status that would not exist in a
situation where the holder received only the note, i.e.:
(a) Whether the reference in the note to the
accompanying purchase agreement for "additional rights
of the holder hereof" is merely an inconsequential reference
to a "separate" agreement under the statute which does
not affect negotiability as the Court of Appeals determined,
or is the reference more reasonably interpreted under
the circumstances as wording of incorporation which adds
an impermissible "promise, order, obligation or power"
as the trial court held?
(b) Whether the language "no other promise, order,
obligation or power" in §70A-3~10Ml) (b) is a separate
requirement for negotiability and not merely an additional
test to determine whether an instrument is unconditional
or conditional as the Court of Appeals seems to be saying?
(c) Does "separate agreement" mean a situation
where the accompanying agreement is not transferred as
a part of the same package or where there is no wording
that can reasonably be interpreted to be words of
incorporation?
(d) What is the legal effect of the knowledge of
and notice to First Federal who prepared the joint assignment to itself of the note and accompanying agreement
as security for its loan to Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary?
To be negotiable a promissory note must be the equivalent
of cash and must strictly conform to the restrictions in the
statute.

Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Co., et al., Utah Adv. Rep. 8,

717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986).

The principal statutory provision

applicable to negotiability is §70A-3-104(l)(b) which states
as follows:

-m(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument
within this chapter must

(b)
order to
promise,
maker or
chapter";

contain an unconditional promise or
pay a sum certain in money and no other
order, obligation or power given by the
drawer except as authorized by this
] '. '. (Emphasis added.)

The statutory powers given by the maker which escape the above
prohibition on negotiability are listed in §70A-3~105 and
§70A-3"112(1).

Thus, if the instrument "contains" any "promise,

order, obligation or power" other than those listed in the
statute, then the instrument is not negotiable.
In 5 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §3-104:9,
the above provision concerning "no other promise . . ."is
discussed as follows:
The language of the code provision under consideration declaring that "no other promise . . . "
may be included appears so categorical that it is
concluded that it must be given its literal effect.
This conclusion has the further advantage of
practical expediency in that it avoids any question
of construction as to whether an additional promise
is or is not a promise of such a character as
to impair negotiability. The above conclusion
provides a standard which the ordinary man in
business can apply for it merely requires the
ability to read the words of the instrument and
see if there is an additional promise. Otherwise
stated, it avoids the complicated interpretation of
additional words in an instrument and avoids the hazard
that a court at a later date might not agree with
the conclusion reached by the businessman reading the
instrument. (Emphasis added.)

-15Courts which have addressed the applicability of the second
part of subsection (b) of the above statutory provision have
held it to be absolute in denying negotiability.

In Geiger

Finance Company v. Graham, 182 S.E.2d 521, 524 (GA 1971),
the court stated that:
If a writing contains any other promise, order,
obligation or power, it is simply not a negotiable
instrument and the concept of a holder in due course
does not apply. . . . The intent is that a
negotiable instrument carries nothing but the simple
promise to pay, with certain limited exceptions.
. . .

The Court of Appeals' discussion of negotiability
focuses on §70A-3~105(c) which allows the instrument to refer
to or arise out of a separate agreement which may contain
rights of prepayment and acceleration.

The instrument may

also contain a statement that it is secured by collateral
and a right to realize or dispose of collateral under §70A-3~
112(1)(b).

The Court of Appeals seems to be basing its dis-

cussion of negotiability principally on whether the promise
or order is conditional or not under the first part of
§70A-3~10Ml) (b) rather than the second part which appears
to require that the instrument must also contain "no other
promise, . . ."
Although those two statutory requirements appear
to be separate and distinct, the Court of Appeals combines
them in its holding that the Air Terminal note is unconditional

-16and therefore negotiable.

The problem is not whether the

Air Terminal note may be conditional or unconditional under
the first part but whether the instrument contains a prohibited
promise, order, obligation or power which would separately
preclude negotiability.

The Air Terminal note contains the

following words:
Reference is made to the Purchase and Security
Agreement for additional rights of the holder hereof.
Even if the accompanying purchase agreement were ignored for
the sake of argument, there are two related questions raised
by the above wording in the Air Terminal note which must be
answered to resolve the issue of negotiability.

The first

question is whether the words "additional rights" in the note
are the equivalent of and have essentially the same meaning
as a "promise, order, obligation or power" in the statute.
It is submitted that the words "additional rights" in the
Air Terminal note are the reasonable equivalent of and would
be included at least under the word "power" contained in the
statute.

Webster defines a "right" as a power.

See WebsterT s

Third New International Dictionary of the English Language,
G & C Merriam Company 1971. The second question then to be
considered is what is the meaning of the word "contain" used
in the statute and whether under such meaning the Air Terminal
note "contains" any other power which would make the note
non-negotiable.

-17Th e words in the note "for additional rights of
the holder hereof" are most reasonably interpreted as words
of incorporation because the holder is specifically directed
to the holderTs rights in the accompanying purchase agreement
which was contemporaneously transferred to First Federal with
the note as a package.

Those rights include a power of attorney

and the right to execute documents, to charge expenses and
pay taxes, among others.
If the note had merely referred to the purchase
agreement and not stated that the agreement contained "additional
rights of the holder hereof"
be an incorporation.

then perhaps there would not

The most reasonable interpretation of

those words in the note is that the note and accompanying
purchase agreement were to be construed as one document.
Certainly First Federal considered the note and purchase
agreement to be a single package because First Federal prepared
the assignment which absolutely ties the two documents together.
Even though a separate agreement does not affect
negotiability under §70A-3-119(2) the question in this case
is whether the accompanying purchase agreement should be
considered as a "separate agreement."

It is submitted that

under the wording in the note and the fact of simultaneous
assignment, the agreement in this case should not be considered
as separate.

5 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §3-101:15

-18states that ". . -if there is any doubt as to whether a paper
is negotiable, it is held to be non-negotiable,"

The obvious

policy reason for the above rule is to prevent claims of
negotiability in doubtful situations such as this one.
In 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §44(b) it is stated
as follows:
. . . where several instruments are made as
part of one transaction, they will be read together,
and each will be construed with reference to the
other, notes or bills of exchange and contemporaneous
written agreements executed as part of the same
transaction are to be construed together as forming one
contract in a controversy between the original parties
or persons standing in their situation or charged with
notice of the contemporaneous agreements.
This general rule applies especially where the agreement relates to consideration yet to be earned, or
where the note contains an express reference to the
agreement, '. '. ". (Emphasis added.)
Also see 5 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §§3~104:7;
3-119:6; Bank of Kimball v. Rostek, 423 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1967).
Any provision in the subject instrument that creates uncertainty
eliminates negotiability.
None of the cases relied on by the Court of Appeals
to support its holding of negotiability, Third National Bank
in Nashville v. Handi-Gardens Supply of Illinois, Inc.,
380 F.Supp 930 (D. Tenn. 1979); Federal Factors, Inc. v.
Wellbanke, 241 Ark. 44, 406 S.W.2d 712 (Ark. 1966); and First
National City Bank v. Valentine, 62 Misc. 2d 719, 309 N.Y.S.2d
563 (NY 1970), involve a situation where the note and

-19accompanying purchase agreement were taken simultaneously
as a single package pursuant to the holder's own words of
assignment.
Question II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS'
DECISION REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT
THE AIR TERMINAL NOTE WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE AND FIRST
FEDERAL WAS NOT A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE CONFLICTS
WITH THIS COURT'S DECISION IN CALFO V. D.C.
STEWART CO., ET AL., 30 UTAH ADV. REP. B, 717 P.2d 697
(UTAH 198b), CONCERNING WHAT CONSTITUTES NOTICE TO AND
KNOWLEDGE OF A POTENTIAL INFIRMITY TO A HOLDER SUCH
AS FIRST FEDERAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HEREIN?
This court stated in Calfo, cited above, at 717
P.2d 697, 700 that:
. . . if the document evinces terms which should
alert the transferee of possible defenses, then the
transferee is not entitled to insulation from those
apparent defenses.
The Court of Appeals wrongly interpreted the Calfo
decision to mean that the Court of Appeals could ignore the
accompanying Air Terminal purchase agreement regardless of
the undisputed and critical fact that First Federal took the
two documents as a security package pursuant to First Federal's
own wording.
Question III. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY
REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT (A) BY HOLDING THAT FIRST FEDERAL
WAS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE BECAUSE IT HAD NO NOTICE OF
A CLAIM OR DEFENSE UNDER §70A-3~30^(2) EVEN THOUGH GUMP
& AYERS, A FIDUCIARY, RECEIVED $18,500 FROM THE $100,000
LOAN FIRST FEDERAL MADE TO GUMP & AYERS BECAUSE RECEIPT
OF SUCH AMOUNT BY GUMP & AYERS WAS NOT A "BENEFIT" UNDER
THE STATUTE, AND (B) BY WHOLLY FAILING TO CONSIDER
ANOTHER PORTION OF §70A-3~30^4 (2) UNDER WHICH FIRST

-20FEDERAL WAS ABSOLUTELY CHARGED WITH NOTICE OP A CLAIM
WHEN GUMP & AYERS, A FIDUCIARY, ASSIGNED THE AIR TERMINAL
NOTE AND ACCOMPANYING AGREEMENT TO FIRST FEDERAL AS
SECURITY FOR GUMP & AYERS' OWN $100,000 DEBT?
Question IV. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRET
§70A-3-119(D and §70A~3~30Ml) IN HOLDING THAT FIRST
FEDERAL WAS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE EVEN THOUGH FIRST
FEDERAL RECEIVED THE AIR TERMINAL NOTE AND AGREEMENT
TOGETHER AND EVEN THOUGH THE AGREEMENT INDICATED THAT
THERE WERE LIMITATIONS AND THAT AIR TERMINAL'S OBLIGATION
WAS PARTLY OR WHOLLY VOIDABLE?
Even if the Air Terminal note were considered to
be negotiable for the sake of argument, First Federal would
not be a holder in due course.

Section 70A-3"119(1) provides

that a holder in due course is not affected by any limitation
in the separate agreement "lt_ he had no notice of the limitation
when he took the instrument. . . . "

(Emphasis added.) First

Federal knew about the Morse problem prior to the assignment
and then later at the time of assignment, First Federal knew
that the purchase agreement specifically gave Air Terminal
default rights and indemnified Air Terminal against the Morse
problem.

Because First Federal had notice of those limitations

in the agreement, it cannot be a holder in due course under
§70A-3-119(D.
First Federal also had notice of a claim or defense
under §70A-3~304(1)(b) and (2) (Utah Code Ann. 1953) which
provides that:
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense
if: . . .
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation
of any party is voidable in whole or in part, . . .

-21(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against
the instrument when he has knowledge that a fiduciary
has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as
security for his own debt or in any transaction for
his own benefit . ] ] (Emphasis added.)
When First Federal made the $100,000 loan to Gump
& Ayers, it knew that it was making a portion of the loan because
of the Morse problem against which Air Terminal was clearly
indemnified and for which Air Terminal had default rights.
Because First Federal had actual knowledge and notice of the
Morse problem and of Air Terminal's other rights, including
indemnity contained in the purchase agreement at the time of
the loan to Gump & Ayers, Air Terminal's rights to a set-off
or default remedies were no longer merely potential or theoretical
and Air Terminal's obligation was then known by First Federal
to be voidable in whole or in part under subsection (b) above.
The Court of Appeals cites Sundsvallsbanken v. Fondmetal,
Inc., et al., 624 F.Supp. 8ll, 8l6-l8 (D. N.Y. 1985), as a
case in which "the precise issue was addressed.T!

The Court

of Appeals' reliance on Sundsvallsbanken is misplaced because
the court in that case specifically held that an earlier separate
indemnity agreement was released by the maker upon execution
of the subsequent renewal note sued upon (Note C) and that
said agreement, even if it were established, had "no relationship
to the obligation" under Note C which had been later executed
at the request of the maker.
Section 70A-3"304(2) states that a purchaser has

-22knowledge of a claim if he has knowledge that a fiduciary has
negotiated the instrument "as security for his own debt . . ."
It is undisputed that Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary, and so known
to First Federal, negotiated the Air Terminal note to First
Federal as security for Gump & Ayers' own debt evidenced by
Gump & AyersT $100,000 note to First Federal.

That fact alone

precludes First Federal from being a holder in due course.
The Court of Appeals' opinion does not discuss that provision of
the above statute which appears to control the issue in this case.
In addition, there was no evidence that the $18,500
portion of the $100,000 note was to repay a debt owed to Gump
& Ayers by Morse, the contractor on the Sunayers project, as
the Court of Appeals concluded.

Thus, the Court of Appeals'

holding that Gump & Ayers received no direct "benefit" under
the statute from the $18,500 is merely an unsupported and unwarranted
conclusion.

Moreover, §70A-3~304(2) does not differentiate

between direct and indirect "benefit" to a fiduciary as the
Court of Appeals does.

It is submitted that the Court of Appeals'

definition of "benefit" under the statute is too narrow because
in this case it must be presumed that even if the entire $100,000
was used for the Sunayers project it clearly resulted in a
substantial benefit to Gump & Ayers who was the general partner
and owned at least sixty-five percent (65%) of Sunayers.

(Purchase

Agreement page 1). First Federal cannot be a holder in due course
because it had abundant actual and statutory notice and knowledge
of the problems.

-23CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals wrongly ignored the accompanying
purchase agreement in determining that the Air Terminal note
was negotiable even though First Federal took the two documents
as integral parts of the same package.

In regard to the question

whether First Federal was a holder in due course, it is undisputed
that First Federal had abundant knowledge and notice of limitations
and problems and at the very least knew that Gump & Ayers,
a fiduciary, negotiated the Air Terminal note to First Federal
as security for Gump & Ayers own $100,000 debt.

It is submitted

that the Court of Appeals wrongly interpreted the applicable
statutes and the Calfo decision, that this is an important
case of first impression, and that Air Terminalfs petition
for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted this

^

/-"aay of April, 1989.

WALTER P. FABER, JR., Attorney
for Petitioner Air Terminal
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing to John W. Lowe, 50 West 300 South, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake
City, UT 84101, postage prepaid, this OT/^fay of April, 1989.

-25-

APPENDIX
Table of Contents:
A. First Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. and Air Terminal Gilts, Inc..,
105 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (April 11, 1989).
B. Findings of fact and conclusions of law.
C. Calfo v. D. C. Stewart, et al., 30 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8, 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986).
D. Air Terminal Purchase and Security Agreement
- 6/5/84.
E. Air Terminal promissory note - 6/5/84.
F. Gump & Ayers renewal promissory note - 6/13/85.
G. Gump & Ayers' list - 6/25/84.
H. Sundsvallsbanken v. Fondmetal, Inc., et al.,
624 F.Supp. 811 (S.D. N.Y. 1985).

CODE • co
\Provo, Utah

First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Air Terminal Gifts
105 Utah * ,dv.

Examination, the manager continued to assert
V 1 Brown had one foot outside the ston
ben stopped by the security officer. Simil
ark, the security officer testified Brown was
oun of the store when apprehended, "rfie
manager did not recall if Brown had slaid
something to the effect that he was not oupide
the store, while the security officer thought
such A statement might have been made/ The
manager also testified he saw Brown riut the
cigarettes in the grocery cart, exit thy store,
and ride\ his bike past the store twic/, while
looking in the store window. We find/that the
evidence was overwhelming as to/Brown's
intent to steal the cigarettes and ary not convinced thank is reasonably likely that Brown's
testimony would have produced dJ\ acquittal.
Therefore, the error in denying x\fe motion in
limine was hawnless
Brown also\claims the trial ciurt erred by
refusing to grant a new trial lycause a juror
had allegedly lied during voir dire questioning
and had made\ derogatory /emarks about
Brown prior to \ury deliberations. In McDonough Power Equipment, Inf. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548 «984), thfe United States
Supreme Court adnressed /he applicable test
where a juror had allegedly failed to disclose
information during vpir d/re questioning. The
Court said,
We hold that toWtain a new trial
in such a situation, a party must
first demonstrate Aat a juror failed
to answer honestMa material question on voir dire, ^nd then further
show that a correct response would
have provided /a valitf basis for a
challenge for capse.
464 U.S. at 556. \k this casfc, the juror allegedly failed to dispose that he had had retail
experience. However, Brown uailed to prove
that the juror acftially had sucA experience and
further failed xa demonstrate that there would
have been "a /valid basis for \challenge for
cause."
In regard / to the allegedly\ prejudicial
remarks made by one juror, the tnWl court met
with the juw after receiving a note from the
jury. The mal court then further\instructed
the jurors/on their responsibilities. W t e r the
jury rendered its verdict, the trial coujt polled
each juror and asked whether the veraict was
infiuenceo by anything other than properly
presented evidence and the court's instructions
on the flaw. Each juror responded appropriately. Rurther, after the motion for a nem trial
was filed, the trial court found that the alleged
statements of one juror were "ambiguous rod
subj/ct to multiple interpretation" and mat
they did not constitute a predetermination W
guilt nor direct prejudice against Brown. Tr\e
trial court's decision on a motion for a nei
pal is largely within the court's discretion^
nd will not be reversed on appeal unless there

27/

Rep. 27
a clear abuse of that discretion. State/
jiams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985)/We
find no abuse of discretion in the triaL^ourt's
refusalNo grant a new trial becaus$/of improper juror\ctions.
Affirmed.
Pamela T. Gr^nwood, Juj*£e
I CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings,"5^6ge
I CONCUR IN THp^E&JLT:
Russell W. Bereft, JudgeN

1. In Wight,ytt analyzed the facts ihtfer 609(a)(1)
because the/prior crime was punishable lw impriso
nment in/<xcess of one year. Id. That secthsm is no
applicatte in this case because the prior conviction:
are for misdemeanors.

Cite as
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IN THE
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION of Salt Lake City,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc., and AIR
TERMINAL GIFTS, INC.,
Defendants and Respondent.
No. S80331-CA
FILED: April 4, 1989
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Pat B. Brian
ATTORNEYS:
John W. Lowe, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Walter P. Faber, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
Respondent
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of
Salt Lake City (''First Federal") brought suit
against Air Terminal Gifts, Inc. ("Air Terminal") on a promissory note executed by Air
Terminal and payable to Sunayers Limited
Partnership ("Sunayers"). The Air Terminal
note had been assigned to First Federal by
Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. ("Gump &
Ayers"), the general partner of Sunayers.
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
found the note was not negotiable and First
Federal was not a holder in due course. First
Federal takes exception to both rulings, claiming it is entitled to enforce the note notwit-
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hstanding any claims or defenses of Air Terminal. We agree, and reverse and remand this
case for further proceedings consistent with
our opinion.
FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. Sunayers was
developing a condominium project in St.
George, Utah called Sunflower. On June 5,
1984, Air Terminal invested $200,000 in the
Sunayers Limited Partnership by paying
$75,000 in cash and executing a $125,000
promissory note ("'the Air Terminal note")
secured by a Purchase and Security Agreement. The note provides: "This Note is
secured by that certain Purchase and Security
Agreement date June
, 1984. Reference is
made to the Purchase and Security Agreement
for additional rights of the holder hereof. *
On June 27, 1984, Gump & Ayers, the
general partner of Sunayers, executed a promissory note in the amount of $100,000 ("the
Gump & Ayers note") payable to First
Federal. Gump & Ayers assigned the Air
Terminal note as further security for the loan
to Sunayers. The proceeds from the Gump &
Ayers note were to be used by Sunayers for
debts incurred in developing the Sunflower
project, one of which was described as the
"Morse Shortfall." Morse was the contractor
on the Sunflower project, and pan of the
Morse Shortfall was an $18,500 debt due
Gump & Ayers.
Air Terminal claims the language in its note
referring to the Purchase and Security Agreement for "additional rights of the holder
hereof makes the note non-negotiable. Air
Terminal further claims that even if the note is
negotiable, First Federal is not a holder in due
course because it took the note with notice of
claims made by and defenses of Air Terminal.
Specifically, Air Terminal claims First Federal
knew a portion of the proceeds from the loan
would be used to pay Gump & Ayers as part
of the Morse Shortfall. According to the
Purchase and Security Agreement, Air Terminal was to be indemnified by Sunayers and
Gump & Ayers from any obligations arising
from the Morse Shortfall.
There are two issues on appeal. First, is the
Air Terminal note a negotiable instrument?
Second, is First Federal a holder in due course
of the Air Terminal note?
Since our task is to interpret the language of
the Air Terminal note to determine if it is
negotiable, and on undisputed facts, determine
if First Federal is a holder in due course, we
accord the trial court's conclusions no deference but review for a correction of error. See,
e.g., Cornish Town v. KoUer, 758 P.2d 919,
921 (Utah 1988).
NEGOTIABILITY
The trial court held the Air Terminal note
was not a negotiable instrument because the
""
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note referenced "additional rights" provided
for in the Purchase and Security Agreement
thereby creating additional powers and promises outside those provided in the note itself.
We must decide whether the "reference" in the
Air Terminal note to the Purchase and Security Agreement "for additional rights" creates
an additional "promise" or "power" under
controlling statutory language which renders
the note non-negotiable.
When determining negotiability, only the
instrument in question should be examined.
Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697, 700
(Utah 1986). See also First State Bank at
Gallup v. Clark, 91 N.M. 117, 570 P.2d 1144,
1146 (1977). In order for a writing to be a
negotiable instrument, it must "contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money and no other promise, order,
obligation or power given by the maker or
drawer except as authorized by this chapter."
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-104(l)(a) (1988)
(emphasis added). A promise or order, otherwise unconditional, does not become conditional simply because the instrument ''refers to
or states that it. arises our of a separate agreement or refers to a separate agreement for
rights as to prepayment or acceleration. ..."
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-105(l)(c) (1988)
(emphasis added). In contrast, a promise or
order is conditional if the instrument "states
that it is subject to or governed by any other
agreement." Utah Code Ann. §70A-3105(2)(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Negotiability is not, however, affected by "a statement
that collateral has been given to secure obligations either on the instrument or otherwise of
an obligor on the instrument or that in the
case of default on those obligations the holder
may realize on or dispose of the collateral ...."
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-l 12(1 Kb) (1988).
Thus, the issue is whether the Air Terminal
note simply refers to or is governed by the
Purchase and Security Agreement. The language of the relevant clause, providing that
"reference is made to the Purchase and Security Agreement" persuades us that the note is
negotiable under §70A-3-105(l)(c).
Cases from other jurisdictions interpreting
similar provisions support our conclusion. See,
e.g., Third Natl Bank in Nashville v. HardiGardens Supply of Illinois, 380 F. Supp. 930,
938 (D. Tenn. 1974)(an obligation is not made
conditional because the instrument refers to or
states that it arises out of a separate agreement); Federal Factors, Inc. v. Wellbanke, 241
Ark. 44, 406 S.W.2d 712, 713 (1966)("The
mere reference to the transaction giving rise to
the instruments does not affect negotiability.");; and 5 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code §3-105:12 at 236 (3d ed.
1984K"The fact that a reference to collateral
security for commercial paper may be ineptly
worded does not impair negotiability when the
sense of the provision is that something is,
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added rather than subtracted from the obligation of the commercial paper.")(citing First
Natl City Bank v. Valentine, 62 Mis.2d 719,
309 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1970)).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the Air
Terminal note is a negotiable instrument.
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
A holder in due course is "a holder who
takes the instrument for value; and in good
faith; and without notice that it is overdue or
has been dishonored or of any defense against
or claim to it on the pan of any person."
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-302(l)(c) (1988)
(emphasis added). Air Terminal claims First
Federal is not a holder in due course of the
Air Terminal note for two reasons. First, it
claims First Federal had notice that Air Terminal's obligation was voidable in whole or in
part under Utah Code Ann. §70A-3304(1 )(b) (1988). Second, Air Terminal claims
First Federal had notice of a claim against the
note under Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-304(2)
(1988).
Section 70A-3-304(l)(b) states, with our
emphasis, a "purchaser has notice of a claim
or defense if ... the purchaser has notice that
the obligation of any party is voidable in
uhole or in part, or that all parties have been
discharged." Under the Purchase and Security
Agreement, Air Terminal was to be indemnified for any reduction in capital or income
based on claims against Sunayers due to the
Morse Shortfall. Air Terminal claims that
because First Federal had notice of this provision, a fact not in dispute, and the loan to
Sunayers which involved the assignment of the
Air Terminal note was to pay the Morse
Shortfall, Air Terminars obligation to pay
was voidable, thus, First Federal is not a
holder in due course.
In Sundsvallsbanken v. Fondmctal, Inc.,
624 F. Supp. 811 (D. N.Y. 1985), this precise
issue was addressed. The payee bank brought
an action to collect on a renewal promissory
note. An indemnity agreement executed in
connection with the note, contained a provision by which the payee bank had a duty to
indemnify the maker against certain claims.
The Ne* York District Court held that the
duty to indemnify the makers from certain
claims did not preclude collection on the note.
In so holding, the court declared that any
claim on the indemnity provision could be
asserted as a counterclaim, but the provision
did not permit the maker to 'avoid* the
note's obligation. Id. at 818. In support of its
holding, the court stated, "[the]... inclusion of
the word 'voidable* [in U . C . C . § 3 304(1 Kb)]1 is meant to restrict the provision to
notice of a defense which will permit any
party to avoid his original obligation on the
nstrument as distinguished from a setoff or
:ounterclaim." Id. (referring to the Official
Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code).

Similarly, the Purchase and Security Agreement gives Air Terminal the right to indemnification from Sunayers for any reduction in
capital of the Sunayers Limited Partnership
resulting from the Morse Shortfall, but it does
not render Air Terminal's obligation on the
note voidable under §70A-3-304(l)(b).
Instead, Air Terminal's right to partial indemnification from Sunayers is independent of
its obligation to pay on the Air Terminal note.
Air Terminal may have a separate claim for
indemnification against Sunayers or Gump &
Ayers, but it cannot use this claim as a
defense to its obligations to First Federal on
the note.
Air Terminal also argues First Federal is not
a holder in due course of the Air Terminal
note under Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-304(2)
which provides:
"The purchaser has notice of a ^
claim against the instrument when
he has knowledge that a fiduciary
has negotiated the instrument... in
any transactions for his own benefit
or otherwise in breach of duty."
Specifically, Air Terminal claims Gump &
Ayers, as general partner of Sunayers, negotiated the note and $18,500 of the $100,000
proceeds from the First Federal loan was paid
by Sunayers to satisfy a previous debt owed to
Gump & Ayers as part of the Morse Shortfall.
Accordingly, Air Terminal asserts First
Federal knew the loan was obtained for the
"benefit" of Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary of Air
Terminal, in contravention of §70A-3304(2).
There is no question that Gump & Ayers, as
general partner of Sunayers, was a fiduciary to
Air Terminal and that proceeds of the loan
were used to satisfy debts of the Sunayers
development project for which Air Terminal
•had given its note. However, Air Terminal
cites no authority for the proposition that
these facts alone establish that its note was
negotiated "for the benefit" of Gump &
Ayers. Furthermore, the case law interpreting
provisions identical to §70A-3-304(2)
require a more substantial link to the fiduciary's persona] interests than exists here. See,
e.g., Nashville City Bank and Trust Co. v.
Masseyf 540 F. Supp. 566, 578 (D. Ga.
1982)("having made a personal loan to Mr.
Thigpen and having permitted him as general
partner-a fiduciary-to assign promissory
notes which were payable to the limited partnership as security for his personal loan, the
plaintiff bank, as a matter of law, took each
of the promissory notes with 'notice of a
claim against the instrument' and thus is not a
holder in due course").
Unlike the facts in Nashville City Bank, the
indirect benefit received by Gump & Ayers of
having a bona fide debt, owed to it by Sunayers, repaid out of the proceeds of the loan is
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not the type of "benefit" proscribed by §70A3-304(2)
Air Terminal also asserts First Federal knew
the note negotiated by Gump & Ayers was in
breach of dut> because First Federal knew the
proceeds were to be used to satisfy the Morse
Shortfall and that Air Terminal was to be
indemnified from the Morse Shortfall under
the Purchase and Security Agreement
As previously discussed, we consider Air
Terminal's claim for indemnification against
Gump & Ayers and Sunayers as a claim independent of its liability on the note Despite
the indemnity provisions, Gump & Ayers had
the right to assign Air Terminal's negotiable
note for the benefit of Sunayers, and did not
breach its fiduciary duty in doing so The
assignment of the note does not vitiate Air
Terminal's claim of indemnification against
Gump & Ayers and Sunayers for funds expended to satisfy the Morse Shortfall In
summary, we do not find §70A-3-304(2)
defeats First Federal's status as a holder m
due course
We hold that the Air Terminal note is a
negotiable instrument and First Federal is a
holder in due course The judgment of the
trial court is, therefore, reversed, and the case
is remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion
Judith M Billings, Judge
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OPINION

DAVIDSO^u Judge:

/
7

Jack C Daniels appeals from a summan
judgment in favor of Deseret federal Sa\ings
& Loan Association, dismissing his notice to
hold and claim a lien on prodem for which he
was both a co-owner and rhe general contr
actor Daniels' claim concerned the timeliness
of filing his notrce and tne profits owed to
him as a limiteck partndT in Park Avenue
Development Comnany (yPark Avenue') The
trial court held thatyiis l/en was both untimel>
and invalid We affirm /

F^CTS
In 1980, Daniels invested approximateh
$28,000 m the develArWent of an eight-unit
condominium proje/t In Park Cit\, Utah
thereby acquiring an interest through a limited
1 Utah Code Ann §70A-3-304(l)(b) the pro
partnership in ParJc Avenue The agreement
vision at issue in this case, is identical to §3
between Park Avenue arid Daniels provided
304(1 )(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code referred that Daniels would recdive approximately
to b> the court in SundsvaJlsbankcn
$80,000 for his pare in the profits from the
saJe of the condominiums and for overhead
Park Avenue alio hired Daniels to serve as the
general contractor for thd condominium
Cite as
project and aareed to pay him approximately
105 Utah Adv. Rep. 30
$ 15,000 for hit services
\
On Augus( 14, 1980, Deserdt approved a
IN T H E
construction loan to Park Aventie and const
in LH COURT OF A P P I
ruction on^ie project commenced B> the end
of July 1991, Daniels had completed all of the
Jack C. DANIELS,
construction
required pursuant to uhe constrThird-Partysf laintiff and/Appellant,
uction
contract
and Park City issutd certificv.
ates of una! inspection and occupanVy for the
DESERET FEDERXL SAVINGS & LOAN
project/Daniels was paid $15,000 fo\ services
ASSOCIATION, A-O^Constnictloo, Inc.,
and labor, but was not paid his promised
Miller Bnck Sales, Eug^e E. Doms, And
share if the profits from the sale of wie conMichael R. McCoy,,
dominiums
\
Respondent.
Apparently, Daniels intended to file aViotice
to h61d and claim a hen on the project, far the
CEN Corporation,
$80,(000 "profit/ within the statutory ptnod
Plaintiff
reouired for filing However, the owneri of
v.
try project were trying to obtain refinancing
Jack CyAantels, Dtbra Esfes, Scott
arid they requested Daniels not to file bis
DebraAnn Sitzberger, and Amy SUntoi)
mechanic's ben for the profit and overhead
Eaeleson,
In leturn, the owners promised Daniels thai
fthey would allocate his share of the profits ta
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

WE CONCUR
Regnal W Garff, Judge
Richard C Davidson, Judge
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Civil No. C86-1224

Crossclaimant,
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

vs.
SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
VICTOR R. AYERS, MICHAEL A. SASS,
JERRY W. FLOOR, GRANT THORNTON,
a partnership, MARY KAY GRIFFIN,
and JOHN DOES I-III, inclusive,
Crossclaim Defendants.
JERRY W. FLOOR,
Crossclaimant
and Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.,
n/k/a V & A, INC., SUNAYERS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, and VICTOR R. AYERS,
Crossclaim Defendants,
-and-

-2MARJORIE B. GUMP, MARION P.
AYERS, FOX & COMPANY, MARY KAY
GRIFFIN, SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG
& HANSON, and CHARLES R. BROWN,
Third-Party Defendants,
SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
VICTOR R. AYERS, MARION P. AYL1RS,
MARJORIE B. GUMP, and GUMP R AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC. n/k/a V & A,
INC.,
Fourth-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
5RANT THORNTON, a partnership,
Fourth-Party Defendant.
The separate trial of the first and severed phase of
the above case between plaintiff Fjrst Federal and defendant Air
Terminal Gifts, Inc., concerning the principal issues whether the
oromissory note signed by Air Terminal was a negotiable instrument
and whether First Federal was a holder in due course thereof, regular
came on for non-jury trial before the above-entitled court on the
30th day of December, 1987, pursuant to the prior determination
by the Court that there was no just reason to delay the trial of
and entry of Judgment as to such issues, the Honorable Pat B. Brian
presiding, First Federal being represented by its counsel John
W. Lowe, Air Terminal being represented by its counsel, Walter
P. Faber, Jr., and no other parties appearing or being represented,
and the parties having previous]y filed extensive written memoranda

-3iscussing the facts and legal issues and having introduced evidence,
aving rested and then presented final oral arguments, and the
ourt having considered the evidence, statutes, legal authorities
n... arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, and after
caring objections to the court's propound findings and conclusions,
.rid after due deliberation, makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On June 5, 198'l Air Terminal agreed to invest $200,000

.n and become a limited partner in the Sunayers Limited Partnership
>f which Gump & Ayers was the general partner.
2.

On that date Air Terminal paid $75,000 in cash and

executed a thirteen page Purchase and Security Agreement ("purchase
Lgreement") and a contemporaneous and integrated companion promissory
iote payable in three installments in the total principal amount
)f $125,000 plus interest.
3-

At the time the purchase agreement and note were signed

representatives of Gump & Ayers told Air Terminal that the purchase
lgreement and note were companion parts erf the same transaction and
protected Air Terminal from separate suit on the note.
k.

The purchase agreement specifically incorporates

bhe note and contains a number of additional rights of and limitations
3n the parties.
5.

A provision in the purchase agreement indemnifies

Air Terminal against any claim involving Morse, the prior contractor
on the Sunayers' project.
6.

The note contains the following statement on its

face just above the signature line:

Reference is made to tho Purchase and Security
Agreement for additional rights of the holder hereof.
7.

The purchase agreement and note were executed at

bhe same time as companion parts of a contemporaneous, integrated,
oackage transaction.
8.

Thereafter, on June 27, 1984, Gump & Ayers, the

general partner of Sunayers, borrowed $J00,000 from First Federal
principally in connection with the Sunayers1 project and signed
a promissory note for that amount, which Gump & AyersT note was
due on December 15, 198*4.
9.

Gump & Ayerr, told First Federal prior to the $100,000

loan that a major portion of the Joan was to pay f or a previous
shortfall caused by Morse, thf* prior contractor on the Sunayers1
project.
10.

A portion ol the $ LOO,000 loan amount requested to

cover the Morse shortfall was allocated directly to Gump & Ayers.
11.

On June 27, 1984 in connection with the $100,000 loan

Gump & Ayers assigned the Air Terminal purchase agreement and note
as a package to First Federal who was the author of and typed on the
bottom of the Air Terminal note the following words of assignment:
Sunayers hereby assigns, with recourse, all of
its right, title and interest in the above promissory
note and the agreement securing it to First Federal
Savings and Loan Assn. of Salt Lake City,
Sunayers Limited Partnership
By Gump and Ayers
Real Estate, Inc.
Its General Partner

-512,

The Gump & Ayers1 note for $100,000 dated June

>7, 1984 was prepared by First Federal and links together the Air
'erminal note and purchase agreement by the following statement
/hich is typed on the bottom ol the Gump & Ayersf note:
The indebtedness evidenced by this note is secured
by a Promissory Note dated June 5, 198*1 and a Se^^t-^
Agreement of even date.
13.

First Federal did not notify Air Terminal of the

assignment and so Air Terminal paid the December 1, 1984 principal
Installment on the Air Terminal note of $41,666.67 plus interest
be Gump & Ayers.

Air Terminal was given credit for its payment.

1*1. On December IS, 198^1 Gump & Ayers executed a second
Dromissory note to First Federal lor $85,221.31 which note renewed
the first Gump & Ayers' note ol $100,000 dated June 27, 1984.
This second Gump & Ayers' note contained the identical statement
as had the first Gump & Ayersf note that the Air Terminal note
and purchase agreement were security therefor.
15.

In the spring ol 1985 Air Terminal discovered that

some ol the representations originally made to induce Air Terminal
to invest in Sunayers were untrue.

Consequently, Air Terminal

refused to make the second installment payment on the Air Terminal
note which payment was due on June 1, 1985.
16.

On June 13, 19^5 after the Air Terminal note was

in default, Gump & Ayers executed a third promissory note for
$85,221.31 to First Federal, which third note renewed the second
Gump & Ayers' note for $85,221.31 dated December 15, 1984. The

-6:hird Gump & Ayers' note also contained the same identical security
statement as had the first two Gump & Ayers! notes,
17.

First Federal first notified Air Terminal in August,

L985 that the Air Terminal note had been assigned to First Federal
md requested that payment of the past due second installment be
nade to First Federal.
18.

When Air Terminal refused to make further payments

on the note, First Federal commenced action against Gump & Ayers
Dn its note and against Air Terminal on its note,
19.

Air Terminal answered that its note was not negotiable

that First Federal was not a holder in due course thereof, and
that First Federal was subject to all defenses Air Terminal could
assert against Gump & Ayers and Sunayers.
20.

The court previously granted summary judgment in

favor of First Federal and against Gump & Ayers on its note dated
June 13, 1985.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties and

2.

The Air Terminal purchase agreement and note were

the issues.

executed at the same time as part of a single package and were
intended by Gump & Ayers and Air Terminal to be companion parts
of an integrated transaction and were not to be considered separately

-73.

By its wording, the Air Terminal note incorporates

the additional rights of the holder contained in the purchase
agreement*
*J. The rights oi the holder contained in the purchase
agreement are in addition to and exceed the statutory rights of
prepayment and acceleration.
5.

The Air Terminal purchase agreement and note were

contemporaneously assigned as a package to First Federal who treated
:hem together as a single integrated transaction from the time
}f the assignment to First Federal.
6.

Because it contains other rights granted by Air

Terminal, the Air Terminal note is not a negotiable instrument.
7.

First Federal knew and was given notice of the Morse

shortfall prior to making the $100,000 loan to Gump & Ayers.
8.

First Federal had notice of the rights and limitations

contained in the purchase agreement and knew that Gump & Ayers
was a fiduciary at the time of the assignment to First Federal
of the Air Terminal note.
9.

Gump & Ayers assigned the Air Terminal note to First

Federal as security for Gump & Ayersf own debt and for Gump & AyersT
own benefit as well as to obtain funds for Sunayers.
10.

First Federal was a purchaser of the Air Terminal

note from Gump & Ayers, had notice of a claim and limitations and
is not a holder in due course of the note.
11.

First Federal is subject to the defenses Air Terminal

is entitled to assert against Gump & Ayers and Sunayers.

-812.

There is no just reason to delay judgment of the

issues concerning negotiability and holder in due course, and therefore the court expressly determines that judgment be entered in
favor of defendant Air Terminal and against plaintiff First Federal
on those issues.
DATED this _5th

da

y

oi

February, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Pat B. Brian
PAT
s * B. BRIAN, District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing
John W. Lowe, 50 West Broadway, #*400, Salt Lake City, UT, and
hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to the followir
THOMAS N. CROWTHER
455 South 300 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 8*4111

DEREK LANGTON
185 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 8*1111

MICHAEL A. SASS, Pro Se
2557 Valley View Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 8*1117

DAVID R. OLSEN
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 8*I101-1*J80
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ause the impoundment and searc
jrere ^admittedly a pretext concealing/an
iovestiga<pry police motive, the evidence
ieJ2ed wasSmproperly admitted at/mal un(Jcr the fourrfc amendment of/rfie United
gates Constitution. 711 P.2# at 270. We
igain note that nerbher papty has discussed
or applied article 1, sfc£iron 14 of the Utah
State Constitution k / t h e facts of the initant case, and therefore\ve do not here
consider any septate state standards. See
ftaie v. Earl/supra.
Defendam's convictions of po!vsession
uid po/session with the intent to distribute
jQntfolled substances are reversed and
E>4«3

—

elo CALFO, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
I.C. STEWART CO., Clara J. DeGraff,
dba CJ. Realty and Roland Vance,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 19309.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 25, 198G.
Holder brought action against promisrealtor and realtor's agent, as guaranr, upon promissory note issued by promior to realtor and sold to holder by realms agent. The Third District Court, Salt
ike County, David B. Dee, J., entered
ir-TW7 judgment for holder and granted
sinissor indemnity against realtor and retor's agent, and upon promissor's motion
, strike, entered order eliminating interest
id stating that summary judgment was
ftperly signed and entered and in full
itce and effect, and promissor appealed
cm guch order. The Supreme Court, Zim^man, J., held that: (1) time for taking
ir

appeal did not begin to run until entry of
order stating that summary judgment was
properly signed and entered, and (2) promissory note stating that note was due in full
upon final closing between promissor and
buyers, which would be on or before certain date, when buyers would exercise their
option to purchase motel, was not negotiable instrument.
Reversed
rections.

and

remanded

with

di-

1. Appeal and Error <e=*347(2)
Time for taking appeal from judgment
did not begin to run until entry of order
stating that previous summary judgment
was properly signed and entered and in full
force and effect, where form of prior summary judgment had not been served upon
defendant prior to submission to trial court,
as required by local rule. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 58A(c); Rule 73(a) (Repealed).
2. Bills and Notes e=>144
To' be negotiable under Uniform Commercial Code, instrument must evidence
signature by maker or drawer, contain unconditional promise or order to pay sum
certain in money, be payable on demand or
at definite time and be payable to order or
to bearer. U.C.C. § 3-104(1); U.C.A.1953,
70A-3-104.
3. Bills and Notes e»144
To qualify as negotiable instrument
under Uniform Commercial Code, promise
to pay and certainty of payment must be
unequivocal. U.C.C. § 3-104(1); U.C.A.
1953, 70A-3-104.
4. Bills and Notes *»144
Instrument's negotiability must be determinable from what appears on face of
instrument, without reference to extrinsic
facts. U.C.C. §§ 3-104(1), 3-105 comment;
U.C.A.1953, 70A-3-104.
5. Bills and Notes *»144
Purpose of requirement that instrument's negotiability be determinable from
what appears on face of instrument is to
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protect transferees from latent defenses to
payment U.C.C. § 3-104(1).

note was not a negotiable instrui ,ent and
reverse the tria) court on that ground.

6. Bills and Notes <3=>342
Transferee is not entitled to insulation
from apparent defenses where negotiable
instrument evinces terms which should
alert transferee of possible defenses.
U.C.C §§ 3-104(1), 3-105 comment; U.C.A.
1953, 70A-3-104.

Stewart owned the Astro Motel in Cedar
City, Utah Defendant Roland Vance, a
real estate ag«jnl for defendant CJ. Realty,
approached Stewart about listing the motel
for sale with CJ. Realty. The listing
agreement was entered into, and Vance
subsequently obtained a potential buyer for
the motel.

7. Bills and Notes <s=>164
Promissory note issued by seller to
realtor, stating that note was due in full
upon final closing between seller and buyers, which would be on or before certain
date, when buyers would exercise option to
purchase motel, was conditional and indefinite on its face, and thus, was not negotiable instrument. U.C.C. § 3-104(1); U.C.
A.1953, 70A-3-104.
8. Bills and Notes e=>452<l), 452(3)
Promissor's defenses of lack of consideration, nonmaturity of note, and failure of
condition precedent were absolute in holder's action upon promissory note, issued by
promissor to realtor and sold to holder by
agent of realtor, stating that note was due
in full upon final closing between promissor and buyers, which would be on or before certain date, when buyer* would exercise their option to purchase motel, where
sale of motel did not occur. U.C.C.
§§ 3-104(1), 3-302(1); U.C.A.1953, 70A-3104.
Michael R. Carlston, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellants.
Joseph H. Gallegos, Michael R. Sciumbato, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
This case involves a suit by plaintiff Angelo Calfo upon a promissory note issued
by defendant D.C. Stewart Co. ("Stewart").
The note was payable to the order of CJ.
Realty and was sold to Calfo by an agent
of CJ. Realty. The trial court granted
Calfo a summary judgment enforcing the
note. Stewart appealed. We hold that the

On September 24, 1979, Stewart and the
potential buyer entered into a lease agreement and option to purchase. The agreement provided that the lessees could exercise an option to purchase the motel on or
before May 1, 1980. Also on September 24,
1979, Stewart executed a promissory note
for $15,900 payable to CJ. Realty to secure
the real estate commission to which CJ.
Realty would be entitled if the lessees exercised their option to purchase. The promissory note provided that it would be payable
as follows:
Total due in full upon final closing between D.C Stewart Co., Seller, and Wendell James Downward and Connie Downward, husband and wife, Buyers, which
shall be on or before May 1, 1980, when
Buyers exercise their option to purchase
the Astro Motel in Cedar City, Utah.
On September 27, 1979, the promissory
note was sold by Vance, acting on behalf of
CJ. Realtv, to the plaintiff Calfo for $12,.
720.
The lessees never exercised their option
to purchase the Astro Motel. However,
after May 1, 1980, Calfo made demand
upon all of the defendants for payment of
the note. Wfhen payment was not forthcoming, suit was brought on the note
against Stewart, and against Vance as
guarantor of the note. Stewart then crossclaimed against his co-defendants for indemnity.
On January 5, 1982, the trial court heard
Calfo's motion for summary judgment.
Calfo argued that the promissory note was
a negotiable instrument on its face, that it
was past due, and that he was a holder in
due course. On that same date, the court
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also heard Stewart's motion for a summary
judgment. Stewart asserted that the note
was not a negotiable instrument and that
Calfo was not a holder in due course. In
addition, Stewart's counsel represented
that if a judgment was granted against
Stewart, counsel for Stewart's co-defendants had consented to entry of judgment on
Stewart's cross-claim for any amounts it
was required to pay Calfo. The trial court
orally granted Calfo's motion. In so doing,
it found the note to be "a good note." The
court denied Stewart's motion against Calfo, but allowed Stewart indemnity against
its co-defendants.
[1] On January 14, 1982, the trial court
executed a document entitled "Summary
Judgment" which awarded Calfo the principal amouiit of the note $15,900, plus interest at six percent per annum from the due
date, and attorney fees of $2,700. Stewart
first became aware of this document in
May of 19S2, *hen Ca:fo attempted to collect upon it by instituting supplemental
proceedings. Stewart's counsel complained
to Calfo's counsel that the form of judgment had not been served upon him prior to
its submission to the trial court, as required by Rule 2.9(b) of the District and
Circuit Court Rules of Practice for the
State of Utah. Efforts to have Calfo's
counsel voluntarily withdraw the summary
judgment failed. Stewart then moved the
trial court to strike the judgment, arguing
that the judgment improperly allowed interest and that it had not been submitted to
opposing counsel for approval prior to submission to the court.
After a series of hearings on Stewart's
motion to strike, the trial court executed an
order on June 7, 1983, stating that "the
lummary judgment entered by the court on
January 14, 1982 . . . was properly signed
and entered by the court on said date and
* in full force and effect
" However,
the court's June 7th order did modify the
1. Rule 73(a) was superseded on January 1, 1985,
'by Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. All relevant developments in this case
occurred under Rule 73(a), although the holding

earlier order by deleting the award of interest.
Stewart appeals from the order of June
7, 1983. Calfo objects to the timeliness of
the appeal, arguing that the June 7th order
merely confirmed the judgment entered on
January 14, 1982, albeit as redrawn to eliminate interest; therefore, the time to appeal
expired one month after January 14, 1982,
not one month after June 7, 1983. Rule
73(a), Utah R.Civ.P.1
The appeal was timely taken. We have
previously held that unless Rule 2.9(b) of
the District and Circuit Court Rules of
Practice has been complied with, the judgment in question is not deemed "filed"
within the meaning of Rule 58A(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the time
for taking an appeal from that judgment
under Rule 73(a) [now Rule 4(a) of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure] does not begin to run because the judgment has not
been properly "entered." Bigelow v. Ingersoll, Utah, 618 P.2d 50, 52 (1980); Larsen v. Larsen, Utah, 674 P.2d 116, 117
(1983); Wayne Garff Construction Co.,
Inc. v. Richards, Utah, 706 P.2d 1065, 1066
(1985). Because Rule 2.9(b) was not complied with here, there was no judgment
from which an appeal could be taken until
June 7, 1983. Stewart's appeal from the
order entered on that date is timely.
[2] Reaching the merits, Stewart argues that trial court erred in finding the
promissory note to be a negotiable instrument. To be negotiable under section 3104(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code,
U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-3-104 (Repl.Vol. 7B,
1980), an instrument must meet four criteria. Specifically, it must (i) evidence a signature by the maker or drawer, (ii) contain
an unconditional promise or order to pay a
sum certain in money, (iii) be payable on
demand or at a definite time, and (iv) be
payable to order or to bearer. Stewart and
Calfo agree that the promissory note in
question satisfies the first and fourth of
of this case with respect to when a judgment is
"filed" is equally applicable under the new Rule
4(a).
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these requirements. They disagree as to
whether second and third are met.
[3] Although the second and third requirements of negotiability are separately
stated, in fact they are closely related.
Both focus on whether the instrument is a
clear and unconditional promise to pay.
These concerns are central to the whole
concept of negotiable instruments and that
should be kept in mind in determining
whether a document is entitled to be treated as a negotiable instrument under the
Uniform Commercial Code. Two important
functions of negotiable instruments are "to
supplement the supply of currency" and to
provide a present representation of "future
pa\ment of money." 1 W. Hawkland, A
Tnnsaetinnal
Guide to the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2.0304, at 459 (1964).
These currency and credit functions
w iul'1 be defeated by conditional promises, because the cosily and time consuming in\estimations that wouM V* required
by such promises would imped' circulation Conditional paper wouid increase
the risks of the holder, and discount
n.tes would be increased commenturately. Substitute? for money must be capable of rapid circulation at minimum risks,
and credit documents are feasible only
when low discounting prevails. Obviously, then, negotiable instruments must be
unconditional to serve the purposes for
which thty are created.
Id. Because a negotiable instrument is a
substitute for money or currency, both the
promise to pay and the certainty of payment must be unequivocal.
[4-6] For similar reasons, an instrument's negotiability must be determinable
from what appears on its face and without
reference to extrinsic facts. See Participating Parts Associates, Inc. v. Pylant,
Ala.Civ.App., 460 So.2d 1299, 1301 (1984);
Holsonback v. First State Bank, Ala.Civ.
App., 394 So.2d 381, 383 (1980), cert, denied, Ala., 394 So.2d 384 (1981). See also
Official Comments to U.C.C. § 3-105.
This requirement protects transferees from
latent defenses to payment, i.e., those defenses which are not readily apparent from

the document. 5 Anderson, Uniform Com,
mercial Code § 3-104:4 (3d ed. 1984) (r^j*
ing upon First State Bank v. Clark, H
N.M. 117, 570 P.2d 1144, 22 U.C.C. R J
§ 1186 (1977)). On the other hand, i f ^
document evinces terms which should aWt
the transferee of possible defenses, tW
the transferee is not entitled to insulatioi
from those apparent defenses.
The whole purpose of the concept of t
negotiable instrument under Article 3 »
to declare that transferees in the ortfc.
nary course of business are only to bt
held liable for information appearing ^
the instrument itself and will not be expected to know of any limitations on r*.
gotiability, or changes of terms, etc., COBtained in any separate documents. TV
whole idea of the facilitation of eagv
transfer of notes and instruments ^
quires thai a transferee be able to trust
what the instrument says, and be able to
determine the validity of the note and its
negotiability from the language in the
note itself.
First State Bank v. Clark, 91 N.M. i n
570 P.2d 1144, 1147 (1977).
[7] The present case involves a promisson,' note which is "due in full upon final
closing between . . . seller and . . . buyers
which shall be on or before May 1, \ ^
when buyers exercise their option to pur.
chase the Astro Motel...." In determin.
ing whether this promise to pay is conditional or indefinite, we are not aided by the
trial court's summary finding that this is &
"good note." The document specifically
states that it is due only upon final closing
"when buyers exercise their option to pur.
chase." This language clearly places the
holder on notice that the note will become
due only upon a contingency which the
holder cannot control, i.e., the exercise bj
buyers of their option to purchase. As foi
definiteness, the date set forth, May l
1980, merely defines when the option tc
purchase expires and does not establish t
time as to when the note will certainh
become due. On these facts, we find th«
note to be both conditional and indefinite
on its face.
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Calfo relies upon the case of Northwestm National Bank of Minneapolis v.
In re DISCIPLINARY ACTION OF
huster, Minn, 307 N.W.2d 767 (1981), in
George McCUNE.
ipport of his argument that language in
ie promissory noie doe& not make the
No. 20140.
bligation to pay conditional. We find this
Supreme Court of Utah.
npersuasive. In Shuster, the promissory
o\e contained language that "[t]his is
March 31, 1986.
romised payment for ownership in Casper
roject [v.-hen] option is exercised for 2nd
alf." Id. at 770. The Shuster court
)und that this reference to an option did
Disciplinary proceeding wTas instituted.
ot create a conditional promise to pay. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J./held that
[owever, it ultimately held that the quoted counsel, who retained out-of-state attorney
iaguage prevented the holder from being to represent client and engaged court re"holder in due course" under section 3- porter to transcribe depositions in a case,
02(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code was subject tadisciplinary sanctions, includecause it placed the holder on notice as to ing reimbursement as condition to reinstatedefense againn payment bated upon fail- ment, for failure to pay tot the reporter's
irt of a condition precedent if the option and other counsel's services, where those
here was not exercised. Id. at 771 The amounts were billpd to th^rclients, who paid
iddings in Shuster— that the note is un- counsel.
onditionai but that it gave the holder noSuspension oraered
jee of defenses—appear to be inconsistent.
He better reasoning would be that the
Howe, J., filed Wncurring statement,
iote was conditional and therefore non-nein which Zimmerman Y J., joined.
Kttiable. See, e.g., Pa^iicipatiig Parts
[&ociate$< Inc. v. Pylantx Ala., 460 Su.2d
t299t 1301-02 a984V
[S] For the reasons stated, we hold that
fce promi^ory note sued upon is not a
jegotiable instrument and that judgment
ras improperly entored against Stewart,
ftere appears to be no dispute in the
j^cord that the sale of the Astro Motel did
jot occur. Stewart's defenses of lack of
•Dtisideration, non-maturity of the note,
pid failure of condition precedent seen, to
|g absolute. We therefore remand the
gje for entry of a judgment in favor of
gfoewart on its motion for summary judgment, and for such further proceedings
gainst the other defendants as are approbate under the pleadings, and as are contitttot with this opinion. Consistent with
Sole 33(a). Utah R.App.P., costs are awardad to appellant.
HALL, C.J., and STtWAKT, HUWt, and
pURHAM, JJ., concur.

1. Attorney and Client <f=)52
Counsel's failure to\ answer formal
complaint issued by ethicfe and discipline
committee pan*! constitutes an admission
of charges that he had failea to pay out-ofstate attorney whom he had engaged to
represent client and certified court reporter
which had been engaged to transcribe depositions in/one of counsel's case
2. Attorney and Client <£=>36(1)
Sup/erne Court's power to regulate
practice of law necessarily includes the
powerpx> discipline a lawyer. Const.Wt. 8,
§§ 1 It seq., 4.
3. Attorney and Client e»36(l)
Legislature's power to regulate and
control attorneys in certain aspects is subject to Supreme Court's inherent power
discipline its officers. Const Art. 8, §§

PURCHASE AND SECURITY AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this
L
day
of June, 1984, by, between and among SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Utah limited partnership (the "Seller"), AIR TERMINAL
GIFTS, INC., a Utah corporation (the "Purchaser"), and GUMP &
AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah corporation (the "General Partner" ) ;
W I T N E S S E T H :
W H E R E A S , Seller is a limited partnership formed
under the laws of the State of Utah on September 2, 1983; and
WHEREAS, Victor R. Ayers initially acted as general
partner for the Seller, and as general partner had an 80% interest in the Seller's capital, net profits, net losses and cash
available for distribution, and as a limited partner, Victor R.
Ayers had an additional 10% partnership interest, all of which
interests have been assigned to the General Partner, and the
General Partner acts as General fdrtnet fut Lin- Seller; anu
WHEREAS, there are two additional limited partners,
Wayne L. Morse, who has a 5% limited partnership interest in
Seller and Michael A. Sass, who has a 5% limited partnership
interest in seller? and
WHEREAS, the Seller desires to sell and the Purchaser
desires to acquire an interest in the Seller representing a 25%
interest as a limited partner in the capital, net profits, net
losses and cash available for distribution of the Seller for the
purchase price of $200,000; and
WHEREAS, in the interest of effecting an infusion of
cash into the Seller, the General Partner agrees that the share
of the Purchaser shall reduce the interest of the General Partner
in the Seller, and shall have no effect on the interest of the
other limited partners;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants, promises, representations and warranties contained herein,
the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:
1. Purchase and Sale of Partnership Interest. Subject
to and upon the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the
Seller hereby sells, conveys, assigns, transfers, and sets over
unto the Purchaser and the Purchaser hereby accepts from the
Seller an undivided limited partnership interest in the Seller,

comprising a 25% interest in the capital, net profits, net losses
and cash available for distribution or such other interest as the
parties may agree to in writing, together with all of the rights
of a limited partner under that certain Certificate and Agreement
of Limited Partnership for Sunayers Limited Partnership dated
September 2, 1983 and which otherwise are appurtenant to the
status of limited partner under Utah law (the "Partnership
Interest")•
2. Price.
The Purchase Price for the Partnership
Interest shall be the sum of $200,000 (the "Purchase Price"),
The Purchaser delivers to the Seller concurrently with the
execution hereof cash, cashier's check(s) or certified funds
representing the amount of $75,000, together with the Purchaser's
promissory note in the amount of $125,000 in the^ form attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference
(the "Promissory Note"),
3. Documents Delivered
Concurrently with the execution hereof, the Purchaser shall provide the Seller with (1) a
UCC-1 form of Financing Statement for filing in the Lieutenant
Governor's
office of the State of Utah with respect to the
security interest of the Seller in the Partnership Interest, and
(2) the Promissory Note, duly executed by the Purchaser.
4. Grant of Security Interest.
The Purchaser hereby
jrants to the Seller a Security Interest in and to the Partnership Interest to secure the timely payment of all principal,
Interest and other amounts due or to become due under the Promissory Note.
5. Term of Security Interest. This Agreement shall be
:erminated only by the filing of a Termination Statement in
accordance with the applicable provisions of the Uniform Comnercial Code as in effect in the State of Utah (the "Code"),
tfhich shall be filed when the Promissory Note has been paid in
full.
Until ' terminated, the Security Interest hereby created
shall continue in full force and effect and shall secure and be
applicable to all amounts owing under the Promissory Note.
6* Covenants.
The Purchaser will do all acts and
things, and will execute all writings requested by the Seller to
establish, maintain and continue a perfected first security
interest of the Seller in the Partnership Interest as a perfected
and first security interest under the Code and will promptly on
demand pay all costs and expense of filing and recording, including the costs of any searches deemed necessary by the Seller to
establish and/or determine the validity and/or the priority of
the Seller's security interest, and the Purchaser will pay all
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taxes and other claims of charges which in the opinion of the
Seller might prejudice, impair, or otherwise affect the Partnership Interest.
7

* Protection of Security.
After 30 days written
notice and demand upon the Purchaser, the Seller may make such
payments and do such acts as the Seller may deem necessary to
protect the Security Interest including, without limitation,
paying, purchasing, contesting or compromising any encumbrance,
charge or lien which is or may be prior to or superior to the
security interest granted hereunder, and in exercising any such
powers or authority to add all expenses incurred in connection
therewith to the obligations secured hereby (it being understood
and agreed that, after taking such action, the S P I I P T shall
notify the Purchaser thereof in writing).
8. Events of Default.
The occurence of any of the
following events shall constitute an event of default ("Event of
Default") hereunder:
a
Any failure or neglect to comply with any
of the terms, provisions, warranties, or covenants of
this Agreement; or
b. Any failure to pay any amount due under the
Promissory Note when due, or such portions thereof as
may be due, by acceleration or otherwise; or
c. The falsehood of any warranty, representation
or other information made, given or furnished to the
Seller by or on behalf of the Purchaser with respect to
the substance hereof, whether such warranty, representation or other information is false when made, given
or furnished, or becomes false through the passage of
time or the occurrence of any event subsequent hereto;
or
d. The issuance or filing of any attachment
levy, garnishment, or other judicial process of or upon
the Purchaser or the Partnership Interest; or
e. Any sale or other disposition by the Purchaser
in the ordinary course of business, or death, dissolution, termination of existence, insolvency, business
failure, or assignment for the benefit of creditors of
the Puchaser or commencement of any proceedings under
any State or Federal bankruptcy or insolvency laws or
laws for the release of debtors by the release of
Purchaser, or the appointment of a receiver, trustee,
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court appointee, or otherwise for all or any part of
the property of the Purchaser.
9.

Remedies.

a. Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default
the Seller may, at it's discretion and without prior
notice to the Purchaser in the event of failure to make
any payments under the Promissory Note, or after 15
days written notice as to any other Events of Default,
declare all or any portion of the Promissory Note to be
immediately due and payable, and shall have and exercise any one or more of the rights and remedies given
to a secured party under the Code, including without
limitation the right to sell or otherwise dispose of
any or all of the Partnership Interest, except that
portion which bears the same proportion to the entire
Partnership Interest as the portion of the Purchase
Price paid by the Seller bears to the total Purchase
Price, and to offset against the Promissory Note the
amount owing by the Seller to the Purchaser.
b. The proceeds of any sale or other disposition
of the Partnership Interest authorized by this Agreement shall be applied by the Seller first upon all
expenses authorized by the Code and then upon all
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred
by the Seller; the balance of the proceeds of such sale
or other disposition shall be applied in the payment of
the Promissory Note, first to interest, then to principal, and the surplus, if any, shall be paid over to
the Purchaser or to such other persons as may be
entitled thereto under applicable law.
The purchaser
shall remain liable for any deficiency which it shall
pay to the Seller immediately upon demand.
c. Seller may, upon the occurrence of any default, declare a forfeiture of all or any portion of
the Partnership Interest except that portion which
bears the same proportion to the entire Partnership Interest as the portion of the Purchase Price paid
by the Seller bears to the total Purchase Price, and
reduce the interest of the Purchaser in the Seller to
such extent for any and all purposes, in lieu of any
other remedy hereunder.
d. Nothing herein contained is intended, nor
should it be construed to preclude the Seller from
pursuing any other remedy provided by law for the
collection of the Promissory Note or any portion
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t h e r e o f , or for the recovery of any others from
which the Seller may be or become entitled for the
breach of this Agreement by the Purchaser.
10. Distributions.
In the event that at any time or
from time to time after the date hereof, the Purchaser shall
receive or shall become entitled to receive any distribution of
any nature whatsoever, whether in property or any other assets,
or the Purchaser shall receive or be entitled to receive securities, property or other assets in the case of any reorganization,
consolidation, merger, or incorporation, then and in each such
case, the Purchaser shall deliver to the Seller, and the Seller
shall be entitled to receive and retain all such securities,
property, or assets as an addition to the Partnership Interest as
collateral for the payment oi the Promissory Note.
11. Indemnification of Purchaser Against Liabilities
of Seller.
Except to the extent of Purchaser's investment in
Seller, including that portion of the Purchase Price actually
paid and any interest thereon actually paid pursuant to the
Promissory Note and/or this Agreement, the Seller and the General
Partner will indemnify and hold the Purchaser harmless from and
against any and all losses, claims, damages, expenses or liabilities joint or several, to which the Purchaser may become subject, and, except as hereinafter provided, will reimburse trie
Purchaser for any legal or other expenses reasonably incurred by
it in connection with investigating or defending any actions
whether or not resulting in any liability, insofar as such
losses, claims, damages, expenses, liabilities, or actions arise
out of or are based upon any contracts, transactions, agreements,
representations, statements, promises, warranties, negotiations,
undertakings, activities, services, expenditures, performances,
benefits, or other dealings of any nature whatsoever, made by or
on behalf of the Purchaser in its capacity as a limited partner
of the Seller, or which are or may become incumbent upon the
Purchaser by virtue of its position as a limited partner of the
Seller, and for which the Purchaser is held liable as a general
partner of the Seller or as a general partner with the General
Partner on the basis of this Agreement, except any such losses,
claims, damages, expenses, liabilities, or actions caused by
specific acts or ommissions of the Purchaser (other than entering
into this Agreement); provided, however, that the indemnity
Agreement contained in this Section shall not apply to amounts
paid in settlement of any such litigation if such settlements are
effected without the consent of the General Partner and the
Seller.
This Indemnity Agreement is in addition to any other
liability which the Seller and the General Partner may otherwise
have to the Purchaser.
The Purchaser agrees that within thirty
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days after receipt by it of written notice of the commencement of
any action against it, in respect of which indemnity may be
sought from the Seller and the General Partner on account of this
Indemnity Agreement, to notify the Seller and the General Partner
in writing of the commencment thereof. The ommission of the
Purchaser so to notify the Seller or the General Partner of any
such action shall relieve the Seller and the General Partner from
any liability which they may have to the Purchaser on account of
the indemnity Agreement contained in this Section, but only if
and to the extent that such person did not otherwise have knowledge of the commencement of the action and such persons ability
to defend against the action were prejudiced such failure;
provided, however, that no failure to give notice shall relieve
such
person from any other liability which he may have to the
Purchaser.
12. Indemnity Against Claims of Morse and of the
Shepherds. Except to the extent of Purchaser's investment in
Seller, including that portion of the Purchase Price actually
paid and any interest thereon actually paid pursuant to the
Promissory Note and/or this Agreement, the Seller and the General
Partner will indemnify and hold the Purchaser harmless from and
against any reduction in the proportionate share of capital, net
income, net loss or cash available for distribution to which the
Partnership Interest entitles the Purchaser, and, except as
hereinafter provided, will reimburse the Purchaser fcr the
reduction of the Purchaser's portion of any distribution insofar
as such reduction arises out of or is bas^d upon any claims
against the Partnership or its property made by Richard and/or
Judy Shepherd of Salt Lake City, Utah or Wayne L. Morse of
Kaysville, Utah. This Indemnity Agreement is in addition to any
other liability which the Seller and the General Partner may
otherwise have to the Purchaser.
13. Admission into Partnership.
It is the intention
of the parties hereto that the Purchaser shall be admitted as a
limited partner of the Seller, but that the investment in the
Seller of the Purchase Price and the grant to the Purchaser of a
25% interest in the net profits, net losses and cash available
for distribution shall be effective even though the admission of
the Purchaser as a limited partner of Seller is, for some
reason, not effective.
In this connection, the Seller and
the General Partner shall use their best efforts to cause a new
and appropriate amendment to the Certificate of Limited Partnership to be issued and to be filed.
It is recognized by all
parties that Victor R. Ayers was Seller's original general
partner, and not all of Seller's limited partners have as of the
date hereof consented to the substitution of the General Partner
for Victor R. Ayers as general partner for the Seller, and that
it may not be possible to obtain an amendment to the Certificate
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of Partnership and/or written consent to admit the Purchaser as a
limited partner in the Seller. Prior to and until the Purchaser
is admitted to Seller as a limited partner, this Agreement shall
be effective to convey to the Purchaser a 25% interest in the
capital, net profits, net losses and Cash Available for Distribution which would otherwise inure to the benefit of the General
Partner, except and to the extent some portion of the Partnership
Interest is forfeited or resold pursuant to Section 9, above, and
also to grant to the Seller a security interest in such 25%
interest.
14. Power of Attorney.
The General Partner shall be,
and hereby is, appointed the true and lawful attorney-in-fact for
the Purchaser as a Limited Partner in the Seller, with full power
and authority for the Purchaser and in the name of the Purchaser,
to make, execute, acknowledge, publish, file and swear to in the
execution, acknowledgement, filing and recording of:
(a) Any amendment to the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership necessary to effect the
admission of the Purchaser as a limited partner in the
Seller or the General Partner as the General Partner of
the Seller, and any separate Certificate of Limited
Partnership, as well as amendments thereto, as required
under the laws or the State of Utah or any other state
in which such instrument is rquired to be filed.
(b) Any certificates, instruments and documents
including Ficticious Name Certificates, which may be
required by, or may be appropriate under, the laws of
the State of Utah or any other state or jurisdication
in which the Partnership is doing or intends to do
business.
(c) Any other instrument which may be required to
be filed by the Partnership under the laws of the State
of Utah or any other state or by any governmental
agency, or which the General Partner deems it advisable
to file, and
(d) Any documents which may be required to effect
the continuation of the Partnership or admission of any
additional or substituted Limited Partner, or the
dissolution of the Partnership.
The foregoing grant of authority:
(a) Is a Special Power of Attorney coupled with
an interest, is irrevocable, and shall survive the
dissolution of the Purchaser;
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(b) May be exercised by the General Partner by
executing an instrument under signature of one or more
of its trustees or other authorized officers as attorney-in-fact for the Undersigned whose name shall be
listed in the respective instruments as a Limited
Partner, assignee or assignor, as the case may be;
and
(c) Shall survive the delivery of an assignment
by the Purchaser of all or any part of the Partnership
Interest; except that where the assignee thereof has
been approved by the General Partner for admission to
the Seller as a substituted limited partner, this power
of attorney shall survive the delivery of such assignment for the sole purpose of enabling the General
Partner to execute, acknowledge and file any instrument
necessary to effect such substitution.
The Purchaser hereby agrees to be bound by all of the
representations of the General Partner as his attorney-in-fact
for the Purchaser and waives any and all defenses which may be
available to the Purchaser to contest, negate, or disaffirm the
actions of the General Partner or other successors under this
power of attorney, and hereby ratifies and confirms all acts
which said attorney-in-fact may take as attorney-in-fact Hereunder in all respects as though performed by the Purchaser.
15.
The Purchaser
follows:

Representations and Warranties of the Purchaser.
hereby represents and warrants to the Seller as

(a) The Partnership Interest is being purchased by
the Purchaser for investment only, for the Purchaser's
own account, and not with a view to, or in connection
with, the distribution thereof, and the Purchaser is
not participating, directly or indirectly, in an
underwriting of all or any portion of the Partnership
Interest.
(b) The Purchaser will not take, or cause to be
taken, any action that would cause the Underwriter to
be deemed an "underwriter" of the Partnership Interest,
as the term "underwriter" is defined in Section 2(11)
of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Act").
(c) The Purchaser has received and the
or its duly authorized representative has
hereby specifically accepts and adopts each
provision of the form of the Certificate and
of Limited Partnership of the Seller.
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Purchaser
read and
and every
Agreement

(d) The Purchaser (and the Purchaser's representative, if any) has had an opportunity to ask
questions of, and receive answers from, persons acting
on behalf of the General Partner regarding the operations and financial condition of the Seller, and has
received all such information it has requested, such
information being furnished solely by Victor R. Ayers,
an officer of the General Partner.
(e) By reason of the Purchaser's knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters in
general, and investments in particular, the Purchaser
is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of an
investment by the Purchaser in the Partnership Interest •
(f) The Purchaser is capable of bearing the
economic risks of an investment in the Partnership
Interest.
(g) The Purchaser's financial condition is such
that the Purchaser is under no present or contemplated
future need to dispose of any portion of the Partnership Interest to satisfy any existing or contemplated
undertaking, need, or indeDtedness.
16. Representations and Warranties of Seller,
The
Seller hereby represents and warrants to the Purchaser that
the Seller and the General Partner have disclosed to Purchaser
all relevant information regarding the financial condition of the
Seller and the General Partner and all relevant data and accounting information regarding the Sunflower project in St. George,
Washington County, Utah, the principal asset of Seller.
17. Transfer Restrictions.
The Purchaser recognizes
that the purchase of the Partnership Interest involves a high
degree of risk. The Purchaser also acknowledges that there is no
public market for the Partnership Interest and that in all
likelihood a public market for the Partnership Interest will not
exist at any time in the future and that, therefore, the Purchaser may not be able to liquidate an investment in the Partnership Interest should the Purchaser desire to do so. It is also
acknowledged that transferability is limited, and in the event of
a disposition, the Purchaser could sustain a loss.
It is acknowledged that the Purchaser or the Purchaser's investment
representative has been given access to the same kind of information as would be furnished in a Registration Statement under
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or has access to such
information and, in addition, has access to such additional
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information as deemed necessary to verify the accuracy of all
information.
The Purchaser acknowledges further that the Partnership Interest was acquired in a negotiated transaction with
the General Partner, or its representatives.
As to limitations
on disposition of the Partnership Interest, the Purchaser recognizes that the Partnership Interest has not been registered under
the Act f and that restrictions on transferability apply as
referred to herein, which restrictions on transferability will be
noted upon such certificates as may evidence the ownership of the
Partnership Interest and, further, such restrictions on transferability will be noted in the appropriate records of the Seller.
The Partnership Interest, or any portion thereof shall
be sold, pledged, assigned, hypothecated, or otherwise transferred, with or without consideration, (a "Transfer") only upon
the conditions specified in this Section 15.
The Undersigned
realizes that by becoming a holder of the Partnership Interest,
the Purchaser agrees, prior to any Transfer, to give written
notice to the Seller expressing the desire of the undersigned to
effect the Transfer and describing the proposed Transfer.
Upon receiving any such notice, the Seller shall
present copies thereof to counsel for the Seller and the following provisions shall apply:
(a) If, in the opinion of such counsel, the
proposed Transfer may be effected without registration
thereof under the Act, and applicable state securities
law (the "State A c t s " ) , the Seller shall promptly
thereafter notify the holder of the Partnership Interest, whereupon such holder shall be entitled to
effect the Transfer, all in accordance with the terms
of the notice delivered by such holder to the Seller
and upon such further terms and conditions as shall be
required by the Seller in order to assure compliance
with the Act and the State Acts.
(b) If, such counsel is unable to opine that
Transfer may be effected without registration under
Act and/or the State Acts, the Transfer shall not
made unless registration of the Transfer is then
effect.

the
the
be
in

The Purchaser realizes that the Partnership Interest is
not, and will not be, registered under the Act, and that the
Seller does not file and does not intend to file periodic reports
with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the
reouirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended. The Purchaser also understands that the
Partnership has not agreed to register the Partnership Interest
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for distribution in accordance with the provisions of the Act or
the State Acts, and that the Company has not agreed to comply
with any exemption under the Act or the State Acts for the resale
of the Partnership Interest.
For example, the Seller has not
agreed to supply such information as would be required to enable
routine sales of the Partnership Interest to be made under the
provisions of certain rules respecting "restricted securities"
promulgated under the Act.
The Purchaser acknowledges that the
Partnership Interest which the Purchaser purchased pursuant
hereto must be held indefinitely, unless and until subsequently
registered under the Act and/or the State Acts or unless an
exemption from such registration is available, in which case the
undersigned may still be limited as to the amount of the Partnership Interest which may be sold.
18. General Provisions.
a part of this Agreement:

The following provisions are

(a)
Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes
the entire understanding and agreement between the
parties hereto and supersedes all prior agreements,
representations or understandings between the parties
relating to the subject matter hereof*
(b)
Binuinvj A<jietftu<ruL.
This A^Letsment shall be
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the
heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns,
as applicable, of the respective parties hereto, and
any entities resulting from the reorganization, consolidation or merger of any party hereto.
(c)
Headings.
The headings used in this Agreement are inserted for reference purposes only and shall
not be deemed to limit or affect in any way the meaning
or interpretation of any of the terms or provisions of
this Agreement.
(d)
Counterparts.
This Agreement may be signed
upon any number of counterparts with the same effect as
if the signature to any counterpart were upon the same
instrument.
(e)
Severability. The provisions of this Agreement are severable, and should any provision hereof be
found to be void, voidable or unenforceable, such void,
voidable or unenforceable provision shaJl not affect
any other portion or provision of this Agreement.
(f)
Waiver.
Any waiver by any party hereto of
anv breach of any kind or character whatsoever by any
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other party, whether such waiver be direct or implied,
shall not be construed as a continuing waiver of or
consent to any subsequent breach of this Agreement on
the part of the other party.
(g)
Modif icat ion.
This Agreement may not be
modified except by an instrument in writing signed by
the parties hereto.
(h)
Governing Law.
interpreted, construed and
laws of the State of Utah.

This Agreement shall be
enforced according to the

(i)
Attorney's Fees. In the event any action or
proceeding is brought by either party against the other
under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs in such
amount as the Court may adjudge reasonable.
(j)
Time of the Essence.
The
agree that time is of the essence.

parties

hereby

(k)
Notices.
All notices required or permitted
to be given hereunder shall be duly given if hand
delivered or maiieo oy certified mail, p^^'La^^ pLc^aiu,
to the following addresses, or to such other addresses
as may be hereafter specified in writing:
If to the Seller, to:
Sunayers Limited Partnership
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
With a copy to:
Charles R. Brown, Esq.
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
If to the Purchaser, to:
Air Terminal Gifts, Inc.
AMF Box 22031
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122
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If to the General Partner, to:
Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc,
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
With a copy to:
Charles R. Brown, Esq.
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(1) Survival of Representations.
The representations and covenants and agreements of the parties set
forth herein shall survive the execution hereof and
continue to be enforceable by the parties in any suit
or cause of action at law or in equity.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
Aqreement effective as of the date first set forth above.
SELLER:
SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a Utah limited partnership
By: GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.
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a Utah corporation
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GENERAL PARTNER:
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.

By: C^2..
Its: .;-;
'
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PROMISSORY NOTE
$125,000.00

June S~ , 1984
Salt Lake City, Utah

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay,
in lawful money of the United States of America, to the Order of
SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, the principal sum of One Hundred
Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) together with interest
on the unpaid balance at a variable rate which shall be calculated by adding One Percent (1%) per annum to the prime lending
rate charged by First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., to its highest
rated commercial * customers, as adjusted from time to time (the
"Prime Rate")The said principal and interest shall be paid by the
undersigned at 2120 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84106, or at such other place as the holder hereof may designate
in writing. The principal payable pursuant to this Note shall be
paid in three (3) installments in the amounts and on the dates
set forth as follows, together with any and all interest accrued
on the remaining unpaid principal balance as of the date of each
respective principal payment.
Principal
$ 41,666.67
$ 41,666.67
$ 41,666.66

Date Due
December 1, 1984
June 1, 1985
December 1, 1985

All payments shall be applied first to the payment of
interest then to the reduction of the unpaid principal balance.
The Prime Rate may change from time to time and the
interest payable on this Note shall continue to fluctuate at the
same increment above the Prime Rate. Any changes in the interest
rate hereunder shall become effective without prior notice on the
date the Prime Rate changes.
This Note may be prepaid at any time, and from time
to time, before maturity, in whole or in part, without penalty or
premium.
All amounts paid shall be credited first to interest
and then to a reduction of the outstanding principal balance.
If any payment of principal and/or interest required
hereunder is not made within fifteen (15) days after the date
such payment is due, or if any other event occurs or circumstances exist which under any instrument evidencing or securing
the obligations evidenced hereby entitles the holder hereof to

accelerate the maturity of such obligations, the entire sum of
principal and accrued interest remaining unpaid shall, at the
option of the holder hereof, become immediately due and payable
Failure to exercise this option shall not
without notice,
constitute a waiver of the right to exercise tha same at any
subsequent time.
This Note, or any payment hereunder, may be extended
from time to time without in any way affecting or impairing the
liability of the maker or endorsers hereof.
The maker, endorsers and guarantors hereof severally
waive diligence, presentment for payment, demand, protest, notice
thereof, and consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
State of Utah and to the extension of time of payment of this
Note without notice, and hereby agree to pay all costs, fees and
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this Note, or in pursuing any remedy
provided Dy tne laws of tne State of Utah, whether such remedy
is pursued by filing a suit in equity or an action at law or
otherwise.
This Note is secured by that certain Purchase and
Security Agreement dated June
, 1984. Reference is made to
the Purchase and Security Agreement for additional rights of the
holder hereof.
PURCHASER:
AIR TERMINAL GIFTS, INC.

By:
Tts
Sunayers hereby assigns, with recourse, all of its right title
and interest in the above promissory note and the agreement
securing it to First Federal Savings and Loan Assn. of Salt
Lake Citv,
Sunayers Limited Partnership
By Gump and Avers
Real Fstate Inc.
Its General Partner

Victor R, Avers, President
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FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
of Salt Lake City
June 13, 1985

Loan No.

S85,221.31

17000100-5

Interest:

13.0%

ON DEMAND or 180 days after date, for value received, I, we, or
ther of us, promise to pay to the order of FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
IN ASSOCIATION at its office at 505 East Second South, Salt Lake City,
ih, the sum of EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY ONE & 31/100s
liars in lawful money of the United States of America with interest
ereon, at the rate of 13.0% percent per annum, (interest computed on
e basis of 365 day year and actual days elapsed). Payable at maturity
om date of note until maturity, and thereafter at the rate of 13.0%
rcent per annum until paid. If the holder deems itself insecure of it
fault be made in paymer.t of the whole or any part of any installment at
e time when the place where the same becomes due and payble as aforesaid
en the entire unpaid balance, with interest as aforesaid, shall at the
ection of the holder hereof and without notice of said election at once
•come due and payable. In event of any such default or acceleration,
>e undersigned, jointly and severally agree to pay the holder hereof
>asonable attorney's fees, legal exprenses and lawful collectio costs in
Idition to all other sums due hereunder.
Tne indebtedness evidenced by this Note is secured by a Promissory
Dte dated June 5, 1984, and a Security Agreement of even date.
GUMP and AYERS REAL ESTATE INC.
UE ON DEMAND: Dgcpmbpr 10

1QR5

Victor R. Avers
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake Citv. VT

R41Off

/President

MONIES NEEDED FOR SUNFLOWER
As of June 2 5 , 1934

j_~EKSD'JE TC MORSE SHORTFALL
S 22,400.00
9,510.00

L y n ^ e Brothers Interim
•* : 1 k ir-s; n [ ; ec t r i e
a»vj be.
G'jr:j * Av

1,200.00
ihOOCCO

ie,iiOo.co
"ULtotal

:0NAL

*~:"±

zAnzr. WcV on East Sice
( 5 5 , i O r cs: t f i U n c c July
JcC:> Sr-;t u ;, A r c h i t e c t
Gco r ce Siane* i
k'i 1 k i n s c n El m e t r i c
Kichce'i Sass
C a r p o r t Ce'.trs ( a l l 60}
Airc'iane k e r t e l

IE)

Subtotal

S 14,332.00
2,000.00
2,600.00
2.700.00
10,000.00
6,294.00
4^00.00
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falmateer v. International Harvester
85 IU.App.3d 50, 53, 40 Ill.Dec. 58fl
592, 406 N.E.2d 595, 598 (3 Dist.l98fl),
re\d in part on other grounds, 85 Ilu2d
124\ 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981);
Stoecklein v. Illinois Tool Works, /nc/589
F.Suto. 139, 145-46 (N.D.I11.1984).
In relevant part, Count III statei only
that the "defendant terminated plaintiff
based on the claim that 'he did not fit the
image oft a Reader's Digest salesperson,'
despite his exemplary sales record and in
contravention of its policy for involuntary
termination^" As a result, plaintiff claims
to have manifested signs of emotional distress in the v>rm of severe depression and
insomnia.
Plaintiff hak failed proj^rly to allege
three of the four elements 6f the tort. He
has not allegedUhat the defendant either
intended to cau$e emotipnal distress, or
that the defendant acted with such reckless
disregard that it $houlo have known that
severe emotional distress was substantially
certain to result Plamtiff has not alleged
any extreme or outrageous conduct by defendant. He has meiely alleged that the
defendant fired him without just cause,
allegedly in violation of an employment
contract. Such conduct\is not extreme or
outrageous. Nor/are such allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
See, e.g., Stoeckflein, 589 RSupp. at 146 &
n. 9; Pudil, 607 F.Supp. aft 444 and cases
cited therein. yFinally, plaintiff alleges only
that he suffered severe emotional distress
(and insomma). "Severe emotional distress" is a conclusion of law wftich must be
supported my factual allegations in the
complaint./ Stoecklein, 589 F.Subp. at 146,
n. 9. Plaintiff did allege proximate cause.
Plaintiff/argues that, though the aurcten is
high, his complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. If the only problem with this
claim/ were the lack of factual allegations
on tie severity of his emotional distress,
we inight be inclined to agree. However,
thy complete lack of an allegation of outg;eous conduct, and the apparent imposki(flity of making such an allegation giver
he facts which are alleged, lead us inevita\

811

^to dismiss Count III for failure to st
a claihvs^pon which relief can be jprtfnied.
Conclusion
For the reasons^t^fed above, defendant's motion todfemissibi^ailure to state
a claim i^ffanted as to Cottut III, and
d e n i ^ i s to Count I. Count II n£&4>een
fidrawn by the plaintiff.
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SUNDSVALLSBANKEN, Plaintiff,
FONDMETAL, INC. and Robern
International, Inc., Defendants
and Third-Party Plaintiffs.
No. 85 Civ. 1453 (RWS).
United States District Court,
S.D. New York.
Nov. 27, 1985.

Payee brought action to collect on a
renewal promissory note. On payee's motion for partial summary judgment, and
maker's cross motions for sanctions for
payee's refusal to submit to discovery, the
District Court, Sweet, J., held that: (1)
alleged conversion of accounts receivable
securing maker's obligations under note
did not preclude payee from collecting note;
(2) fact that payee allegedly breached its
alleged duty to indemnify maker's principal
against certain claims bearing no relationship to maker's obligations under note did
not preclude payee's collection of note; (3)
payee was a holder in due course; and (4)
sanctions for payee's failure to respond
expeditiously to discovery requests were
not warranted.
Judgment in accordance with opinion.
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1. Federal Civil Procedure G=»2544
If opponent to summary judgment motion iafls to aflege that there are substantial facts in dispute, his reliance on unsubstantiated denial of accuracy of movant's
affidavits is insufficient to controvert a motion for summary judgment. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <^2553
Rule 56(f) requires district court to insure that parties have reasonable opportunity to make their record complete before
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 56(f), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>2553
Rule 56(f), requiring district court to
insure that parties have reasonable opportunity to make their record complete before
ruling on motion for summary judgment, is
not a shield against all summary judgment
motions; litigants seeking relief under
Rule 56(f) must show that material sought
is germane to claim or defense and is neither cumulative nor speculative. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(f), 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Bills and Notes <$=>452(1)
Alleged conversion of accounts receivable securing maker's obligations under renewal promissory note did not preclude
payee from collecting on that note, in that
security agreement did not pertain to any
specific accounts receivable, payee had no
duty to protect those receivables, and
payee was not aware of the alleged conversion.
5. Bills and Notes *»452(1)
Fact that payee allegedly breached its
alleged duty to indemnify maker's principal
against certain claims bearing no relationship to maker's obligations under renewal
promissory note did not preclude payee's
collection of note.
€. Bills and Notes *»353
Renewal promissory note was supported by independent consideration and,
thus, was taken "for value" so as to make
payee a holder in due course, where payee
liberalized payment schedule on remainder
of funds due on previous promissory note

from maker and declined to place maker
default on payments under previous noi
\3.CX. § * • » » .
See publication Words and Phrase*
for other judicial constructions anc
definitions.
7. Bills and Notes e=>337
Under U.C.C. § 3-302, defining
"holder in due course," it does not matter,
for purposes of "good faith" whether rea
sonable person would have known thai
something in transaction was amiss, but
merely that holder did not know that transaction was suspect.
8. Bills and Notes $=»332
For purposes of holder in due course
status notice of defenses against an instrument means actual subjective knowledge ol
defenses, and not mere existence of suspicious circumstances. U.C.C. § 3-302.
9. Bills and Notes <&=>336
Ffcst tt\?>l rn&tat's pYYfc^Y&l sAtefe^dfy
notified payee that principal had suspicions
that third party was converting accounts
receivable securing maker's obligations under renewal promissory note did not mean
that payee took note in bad faith and, thus,
was not a holder in due course, in that
principal did not assert such alleged conversion as excuse for nonpayment of note,
and note had been executed as result oi
payee's willingness to renegotiate prior
promissory note at behest of maker
U.C.C. § 3-302.
10. Bills and Notes e»337
For purposes of holder in due course
status, promissory note is not taken in bad
faith if payee has agreed to renegotiate I
prior promissory note rather than place
maker in default. U.C.C. § 3-302.
11. Bills and Notes *»332
Fact that maker's principal allegedlj
notified payee that he had suspicions thai
accounts receivable securing maker's obli
gations under renewal promissory note
were being converted by third party did nol
constitute notice of a defense to the note s(
as to preclude payee's status as a holder u
due course, and, thus, to preclude collectior
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of the note.
304(l)(b).

U.C.C. §§ 3-302(l)(c), 3-

12. Federal Civil Procedure $=>1278
Sanctions for plaintiffs failure to respond expeditiously to defendant's discovery requests were not warranted, where
defendant failed to show that it lacked any
relevant information within plaintiffs control for purposes of responding to plaintiffs summary judgment motion. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc'.Rules 37, 56(f), 28 U.S.C.A.
Carey & Deinoff, New York City, for
plaintiff; Michael Q. Carey, of counsel.
Lerich & Lerich, New York City, for
defendants and third-party plaintiffs; Hyman D. Lerich, Eric Moss, of counsel.
OPINION
SWEET, District Judge.
Plaintiff
Sundsvallsbanken
("SVB")
brings this motion for partial summary
judgment under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., to
collect on a renewal promissory note executed by defendants Fondmetal, Inc. and
Robern International, Inc. (collectively
"Fondmetal/USA") in favor of SVB.
Fondmetal/USA opposes the motion for
partial summary judgment claiming that it
is entitled to pursue additional discovery
under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and cross-motions for an
order pursuant to Rule 37(d) imposing sanctions against SVB for refusal to submit to
discovery in this action. For the reasons
set forth below, SVB's motion for partial
summary judgment on the note is granted,
and Fondmetal/USA's motion for sanctions
is denied.
Facts
The following facts are undisputed except as noted.
This action arises from the division of the
business affairs of defendants and their
principal Bernt C. Rathaus ("Rathaus")
from those of Fondmetall/AB, a Swedish
company, and its principal Anders J. Lofberg ("Lofberg"). In order to terminate
and dissolve their joint venture in 1984,

Rathaus, Lofberg, SVB and to a fctwr
extent Skandinaviska
oNauum»»«»» Enskflda Banken*
("SEB") entered into a comnk* senes 01
agreements. On June 7.19S4 Rathaus sold
Lofberg all the shares of common stock
which Rathaus owned in Fondmetail/AB,
the Swedish company. On the same day,
Lofberg and Rathaus agreed that Fondmetal/USA owed Fondmetail/AB »l.«",000.00 and entered into a Settlement and
Security agreement ("Settlement Agreement"). The agreement P W n d e d „ ^
Fondmetal/USA would pay Fondmetall/AB
$1,400,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory
note ("Note A") which was simultaneously
executed and delivered w:th a»e agreement
and as part consideration for the redirection of the amount which Fondmetall/AB
claimed it was owed. Fondnwull. AB received a security interest in and hen upon
all of Fondmetal/USA's accounts and chattel papers. The Settlement Agreement
also provided that Fondmetall/AB could assign its rights under the agreement, and all
the rights and obligations under the agreement would inure to the benefit of and be
binding upon the assignee. Also on June 7,
1984, the parties executed two Limited Release and Indemnification Agreements ( Indemnification Agreements").
In the first indemnification, Fondmetall/AB and Lofberg released Fondmetal/USA and Rathaus from certain obligations and claims, and in turn they agreed
to indemnify Fondmetall/AB and Lofberg
from acts of Rathaus, the companies or
officers up to June 7, 1984. In the second
indemnification
agreement,
Fondmetal/USA and Rathaus released Lofberg and
Fondmetall/AB from certain obligations
and in return Lofberg and Fondmetell/AB
agreed to indemnify Fondmetal/USA and
Rathaus with respect to activities of the
Swedish company or its officers up to June
7,1984.
Finally, on June 7,1984, Fondmetall/AB
assigned Note A to SVB, a note which was
to "be paid in four installments beginnmi
August 1, 1984, ending July 1, W85
Simultaneously, Fondmetall/AB also as
signed its rights under the Settlemen
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Agreement to SVB. Each assignment was
agreed to by Fondmetal/USA, and each
assignment provided a conditional indemnification agreement for the benefit of
Fondmetal/USA which by its terms indemnified the companies against any claim
which SEB might make against them in
relation to the Fondmetall/AB default:
. . . in the performance of a loan granted
by [SEB] to [FONDMETALL] in the
principal amount of U.S. $290,000. The
agreement by [SVB] to hold [FONDMETAL/USA] harmless shall not include
any other claim which [SEB] may have
against [FONDMETAL/USA] for any
other reason whatsoever.
The agreement by [SVB] to hold
[FONDMETAL/USA] harmless as set
out above shall not entitle them to a
setoff against or in any way limit the
[Fondmetal/USA] obligations under the
Promissory Note or the Assignment to
[SVB] by [Fondmetal]] of all its rights
under said Promissory Note ...,"
Neither assignment provides for personal
indemnification of Rathaus. (Exh. D, Rathaus Affidavit of 7/7/85 Doc. * 1 & 2).
After the completion of these agreements, Fondmetal/USA began making payments to SVB under Note A.1 However, in
October of 1984, Rathaus informed SVB
that he would be unable to meet the payment schedule under Note A, and on October 31, 1984 the parties entered into an
amended Settlement Agreement and a renewed promissory note ("Note B"). Similar events resulted in another amended
Settlement Agreement and renewed promissory note ("Note C") on January 24, 1985.
The amount of Note C was $450,000.00,
Fondmetal/USA having paid $950,000.00
pursuant to Notes A and B. These amendments altered the payment schedules for
the indebtedness to Fondmetal/USA's benefit, but provided for the immediate accrual

of interest on all principal amounts outstanding under the renewal notes.
Fondmetal made no payment on Note C,
and SVB commenced this suit to recover
the monies due.
Discussion
All doubts must be resolved and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor
of the party opposing the motion. United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655,
82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per
curiam); United States v. One Tintoretto
Painting Entitled "The Holy Family with
Saint Catherine and Honored Donor",
691 F.2d 603, 606 (2d Cir.1982). This Circuit has long endorsed a policy of allowing
the development of a full factual record
through trial of the issues presented, a
policy which is limited by the grant of
summary judgment. See Jaroslawicz v.
Seedman, 528 F.2d 727, 731 (2d Cir.1975).

1. The parties are in dispute over what reasons
were given for the inability to meet the Note A
payment schedule. While Rathaus and SVB
agree that Rathaus mentioned that he suspected
Lofberg of unlawfully converting accounts receivable of Fondmetal/USA, Rathaus claims
that he offered this conversion as the reason

why he could not make payments. SVB, however, submitted a telex of October 29, 1984 from
Rathaus to Mr. Thord Soderlund (SVB's Executive Vice President), explaining that the inability
to pay was the result of a delayed shipment
from China. (Affidavit of Pelle Deinoff, Exhibit
2).

[1] The burden faced by the moving
party should not, however, be made so
insurmountable as to vitiate summary
judgment relief. If the opponent to the
summary judgment motion fails to allege
that there are substantial facts in dispute,
his reliance on an unsubstantiated denial of
the accuracy of the movant's affidavits is
insufficient to controvert a motion for summary judgment. Project Release v. Provost, 722 F.2d 960, 968 (2d Cir.1983); see
WIXT Television, Inc. v. Meredith Corp.,
506 F.Supp. 1003 (N.D.N.Y.1980).
[2,3] Fondmetal/USA has interposed
legal defenses against the collection on the
promissory note, and has requested postponement of the motion pursuant to Rule
56(f) asserting the need for added discovery of information under SVB's control.
Rule 56(f) requires the court to ensure that
the parties have a reasonable opportunity
to make their record complete before ruling
on a motion for summary judgment

SUNDSVALLSBANKEN v. FONDMETAL, INC.
Cite a. 624 F^upp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)

Berne Street Enterprises v. American Export lsbrandteen Co., 289 F.Supp. 195
(S.D.N.Y.1968). However, Rule 56(f) is not
a shield against all summary judgment motions. Litigants seeking relief under the
Rule must show that the material sought is
germane to the defense, and that it is neither cumulative nor speculative. Quaker
Chair Corp. v. Litton Business Systems,
Inc., 71 F.R.D. 527, 533 (S.D.N.Y.1976).
"A 'bare assertion' that the evidence supporting a plaintiff's allegation is in the
hands of the defendant is insufficient to
justify a denial of a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56(f)." Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service,
648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir.1981).
Fondmetal/USA's three major opposition
claims will be considered in light of these
summary judgment and Rule 56(f) standards.
Conversion claim
Fondmetal/USA claims that SVB is not
entitled to collect on the promissory note
because it assisted in, or at least had
knowledge of, an alleged conversion of certain of Fondmetal/USA's European accounts receivable by Rathaus' estranged
partner Lofberg and Fondmetall/AB. According to Rathaus, SVB should bear responsibility for the conversion because it
was aware that the conversion was taking
place and knew that the accounts receivable were the assets which Fondmetal/USA
was liquidating to pay the loan installments. Rathaus charges that SVB was
Lofberg's partner in the negotiation of
Note A and the related documents, including the Settlement Agreement, which provided in part:
4. In consideration of the reduction of
the amount claimed by [Fondmetall/Sweden], each Debtor [e.g., Fondmetal/USA
and Robern] hereby
grants
to
[Fondmetall/Sweden] a continuing security interest in and lien upon all of
the Debtor's accounts and chattel paper
now or hereafter existing or acquired
and all proceeds and products thereof
(the "Collateral"), as security for the due
payment of all of the indebtedness of the
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Debtors to [Fondmetall/Sweden], up to a
maximum amount of $1,400,000.
(Rathaus Reply Affidavit of 9/23/85 (emphasis supplied)).
According to Fondmetal/USA, this provision in the original Settlement Agreement,
subsequently adopted by SVB in the assignments and revisions resulting in Note
C, demonstrates that SVB knew that these
accounts receivable were security for the
notes and were the source of payment on
the Notes. Rathaus also contends that if
permitted to continue discovery along this
vein, he may demonstrate that SVB was a
co-tortfeasor in the diversion of the accounts receivable.
[4] Even viewed in a light most favorable to Fondmetal/USA, the party opposing the motion, Fondmetal/USA's conversion defense fails to assert a legal bar to
the entry of summary judgment on the
note and could only support a request for
increased discovery on a conversion counterclaim against SVB and Lofberg.
Fondmetal/USA has not established that
SVB had any duty to protect these receivables, that SVB interfered with Fondmetal's
collection of the receivables, or that it
would make any difference whatsoever to
collection on the note if they had been able
to establish such a breached duty.
The above quoted passage in the Security Agreement explicitly refers to a security
interest in "all of the Debtor's accounts
and chattel paper/' and does not earmark
any specific account, European or otherwise, as the security for the undertaking.
Assuming arguendo, that Fondmetal/USA
had even claimed that there was such a
specific understanding about the collateral,
it would not change the fact that this passage does not create a duty upon SVB or
any other party to preserve the underlying
accounts receivable. Because SVB was not
the beneficiary of this alleged conversion
of the accounts receivable it works as much
to SVB's disadvantage as it does to Rathaus' disadvantage, as SVB is the lien
creditor oeing deprived of its security interest in the accounts. While an alleged con-
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version by either Lofberg or SVB might be
a defense against SVB's collection on the
Settlement Agreement, it does not establish a defense as to collection on Note C, an
independent promissory obligation. The
New York Courts have enforced this separation between actions against holders of
promissory notes and actions asserting
fraud in connection with the security given
in exchange for these notes. See Reid v.
Budget Credit, 5 Misc.2d 949, 162 N.Y.S.2d
750, 752 (Sup.Ct., Kings Cty., 1957) ("The
wage assignment contract was purportedly
given as collateral security for the payment
of an alleged promissory note. The respondent may be found to be a holder in due
course of such a note. But as regards its
rights under the assignment of wage contract, the assignee takes subject to any
defenses or infirmities thereof since it is
not a negotiable instrument"). Accord,
Edwards v. Budget Credit, 8 Misc.2d 897,
167 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586 (Sup.Ct., Kings Cty.,
1957); Cajuste v. Budget Credit, Inc., 5
Misc.2d 948, 162 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup.Ct,
Kings Cty., 1957).
Furthermore, Fondmetal/USA has not
produced written evidence other than the
Settlement Agreement that it was relying
on the payments of these accounts receivable to meet its obligations on the Note.
SVB has produced a telex from Fondmetal/USA stating that the basis for its failure to meet the payment schedule under
Note B was a delayed shipment of goods
without reference to the alleged conversion.
In short, SVB's rights under the promissory Note C are independent of any conversion claim against SVB based on the security agreement lien provisions,2 and Fondmetal/USA has not cited any authority for the
proposition that the security agreement
pertains to any specific accounts receivable, that anyone had any duty to protect
2. For the purposes of this motion,
Fondmetal/USA's assertion is accepted to the
effect that despite the repeated assignments and
renewals of the promissory notes, SVB stands in
the shoes of Lofberg for the purposes of the
Security Agreement negotiated in conjunction
with Note A.

those receivables, or that Fondmetal has a
basisfor belieyirjgJhat^Vjb jgas awanTof
thlTallfigfid^conversion.
Indemnification against claims of SEB
Fondmetal/USA's
second
defense
against summary judgment is that SVB
breached its duty to indemnify Rathaus
against claims deriving from a guaranty
which Rathaus executed on an account
maintained by Fondmetall/AB at SEB.
However, neither of the two indemnification agreements negotiated in connection
with the assignment of the note and security agreement purports to indemnify Rathaus, but extends by their terms only to
the liabilities of Fondmetal, Inc. and Robem International. In addition, they indemnify these companies only as to claims
made against a loan granted by SEB in the
principal amount of $290,000.00 and not an
action on the Overdraft Facility account
which Rathaus personally guaranteed3 and
upon which he is being sued upon as guarantor.
Rathaus contends that an omission of his
name from the language of this indemnity
was a "drafting error" and he has submitted copies of his attorney's letters to
SVB requesting the correction of this error. SVB counters that the personal guaranty of Rathaus was specifically excluded
from the initial release and indemnity
agreement, indicating that the parties were
very aware of the two distinct Fondmetall/AB accounts at SEB, and that they did
not intend to bring the Overdraft Checking
Facility into the scope of the indemnity
provisions:
Limited Release and Indemnification
Agreement
"1) Except for the full performance o*
any and all of the terms and condition
of a certain agreement . . . and for th<
enforcement of any claims that may b
3. Fondmetall/AB maintained two accounts J
SEB, only one of which was guaranteed b;
Rathaus.
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made under a personal guaranty from
Bernt C. Rathaus to SE Banken, Sweden,
for the debt of Fondmetall/AB, . . . "
(Rathaus Affidavit 7/7/85, Exhibit B, doc.
2) (Limited Release and Indemnification
Agreement).
[5] However, even if SVB had breached
such a duty to indemnify Rathaus, it does
not affect Fondmetal/USA's obligation under Note C. The indemnity agreement itself provides that "The agreement by
[SVB] to hold [Fondmetal/USA and Robern
International] harmless as set out above
shall not entitle them to a setoff against or
in any way limit [Fondmetal, Inc. and Robern International's] obligations under the
Promissory Note or the Assignment to
[SVB] by [Fondmetall/AB] of all its rights
under said Promissory Note ...," (Rathaus
Affidavit 7/7/85 Exhibit D, Docs. 1 & 2).
The claim on this indemnity agreement
thus cannot block summary judgment on
Note C against Fondmetal/USA because
even if established it bears no relationship
to the obligation under the promissory
note.
Holder in due course
In another attempt to forge a legal link
between the allegedly unlawful acts of Lofberg and his company and SVB, Fondmetal/USA charges that SVB does not qualify
as a holder in due course under section
3-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
and is thus subject to all of the claims and
defenses against payment on the note
available pursuant to section 3-306 4 of the
Code, in this case the conversion and indemnification claims discussed above.
However, a survey of the requirements
for holder in due course status indicates
that SVB has met the prerequisites set out
in 3-302:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder
who takes the instrument
4. Section 3-306 provides in relevant part:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due
course any person takes the instrument subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any
person; and
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(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or
has been dishonored or of any defense
against or claim to it on the party of
any person.
[6] Fondmetal/USA first claims that
the Note was not taken "for value" because Fondmetall/AB assigned the note to
SVB in satisfaction of an extant debt.
Whatever the merits of this argument, it is
one which relates to Note A, and not Note
C, the one at issue in this motion. Note C
was negotiated between SVB and Fondmetal/USA and was supported by independent
consideration. It is undisputed that SVB
liberalized the payment schedule on the
remainder of the funds due on the note
when Note C was executed, and declined to
place Fondmetal/USA in default on the
payments under Note B (Deinoff Affidavit,
9/12/85, Exhibit B).
[7-9] Fondmetal/USA also asserts that
SVB did not take the note in "good faith"
because Rathaus had notified SVB that he
had suspicions that Fondmetall/AB was
converting the European accounts receivable of Fondmetal/USA. Good faith under
Code section 3-302 is governed by its definition in section 1-201(19) which provides:
(19) "Good Faith" means honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned.
Under this subjective standard it does not
matter whether a reasonable person would
have known that something in the transaction was amiss, but merely that the holder
did not know that the transaction was suspect. Chemical Bank of Rochester v. Haskell, 51 N.Y.2d 85, 432 N.Y.S.2d 478, 411
N.E.2d 1339 (1980). Fondmetal/USA asserts that because Rathaus notified an SVB
officer that he had suspicions of conversion
before the execution of the note that this
was enough to convert acceptance of Note
(b) all defenses of any party which would be
available in an action on a simple contract;
and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance of any condition
precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose (Section 3-408); and
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C into an act of bad faith. However, the
facts surrounding the execution of Note C
cannot support a charge of bad faith. As
will be discussed under the question of
notice infra, notice of defenses against an
instrument means actual subjective knowledge of defenses, and not the mere existence of suspicious circumstances. Travelers Indemnity Company i>. American Express Co., 559 F.Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
[10] When Note B was extinguished
and Note C was executed, Rathaus did not
assert this alleged conversion as an excuse
for non-payment of the note which weakens
his claim that the notice was sufficient to
make SVB an actor in bad faith. Furthermore, SVB renegotiated the note at the
behest of Rathaus and Fondmetal/USA,
and granted this extension of time to accommodate a payor who had already paid
$950,000.00 of a $1,400,000.00 loan.
Fondmetal/USA has cited no authority
which makes it bad faith to renegotiate a
promissory note rather than place the payor in default.
[11] Related to this charge of bad faith
is Fondmetal/USA's belief that this same
notice of Lofberg's conversion is notice of a
defense or claim under 3-302(l)(c). This
contention ignores the wording of the statute and its definitional counterpart in section 3-304. Section 3-302(lXc) speaks of
notice of any "defense against or claim to
it on the part of any person." (emphasis
supplied), meaning a defense on the instrument in question, and not on the collateral
Security Agreement. Section 3-304(lXb)
reinforces the nature of this notice of a
defense by providing:
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim
or defense if ..
(b) the purchaser has notice that the
obligation of any party is voidable in
whole or in part, or that all parties
have been discharged.
Official Comment 3 to this section provides
that the inclusion of the word "voidable" is
meant to restrict the provision to notice of
a defense which will permit any party to
avoid his original obligation on the instrument as distinguished from a setoff or

counterclaim. Thus Rathaus' notice to
SVB that Lofberg might have breached the
provisions of the Security Agreement
would not be notice of a defense or claim
pursuant to sections 3-304 and 3-302 of the
Code.
Although Fondmetal/USA can
maintain a counterclaim based on these
charges, its existence will not deprive SVB
of its status as a holder in due course and
will not prevent the entry of summary
judgment. See Maglich v. Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan, RC, 97 A.D.2d 19, 468 N.Y.S.2d
618 (App.Div. 1st Dept.1983).
Discovery Sanctions
[12] Fondmetal/USA has moved pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for an order imposing sanctions
on SVB for failure to respond expeditiously
to discovery requests. Sanctions are unwarranted in this case in view of the circumstances surrounding the SVB's summary judgment motion. On June 12, 1985,
this court provided for discovery to be completed by November 6, 1985. However, on
July 15, 1985, SVB filed a motion for summary judgment, staying all discovery pending the resolution of this motion. In view
of the fact that Fondmetal/USA has failed
to show that it lacks any relevant information within SVB's control for the purposes
of its Rule 56(f) claim, sanctions for failure
to produce such information are not indicated. Of course, Fondmetal/USA will be
able to undertake continued discovery with
regard to its counterclaims against SVB
and third party defendants Lofberg and
Fondmetall/AB.
Fondmetal/USA has not disputed that it
executed an unconditional promissory note
in favor of SVB and that it has defaulted
on the payments due under such note. Because no material dispute of those facts
exists, and no further discovery under Rule
56(f) is warranted, SVB is entitled to oartial summary judgment on Note C.
Submit judgment on notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

